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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS,
AND DISPOSITION IN COURT BELOW

Plaintiffs Dr. and Mrs. Allen R. Grahn

(herein also

referred to as "Grahns") do not accept the Statement of the Case
made by Defendant Herold L. Gregory, Trustee, for and on behalf

1

of the Marital and Family Trusts of the Albert Eccles Family
Trust (herein referred to as "Gregory" or "Defendant Trusts").
Plaintiff respectfully submits the following statement.
In the Court below, Dr. and Mrs. Grahn sought relief
from the Defendant Trusts and Dean and Christi Bradshaw, (herein
referred to as "Defendants Bradshaw" or "Bradshaws"), seeking,
inter alia, reformation of the legal description, in a deed to
Plaintiff's real property, to include all of the Private Drive
which had historically provided access to the home on their new
estate.

The Private Drive had been represented, intended and

agreed to be situated thereon, but mistakenly was not included in
the legal description.
Plaintiffs also sought: to enjoin Defendants Bradshaw
from

fulfilling their threats to break ground on the Private

Drive on that land; specific performance and enforcement of an
easement for aesthetic protection of the land next to the Private
Drive; to recover damages from Gregory and Bradshaws for alleged
conspiracy and deceitful behavior to deprive Plaintiffs of their
rights to that property; and an Order of Rescission of the sale
of the adjacent parcel by Defendant Trusts to Defendants Bradshaw
and, accordingly, the reinstatement of the Plaintiffs7 option and
first right of refusal to purchase that adjacent property, plus
damages, including attorneys fees, for breach of that option by

2

Defendant Trusts.
Defendant,

the

Plaintiffs also sought relief from another

surveyor,

Mr.

McNeil

for his

negligence

in

drafting the legal description.
Defendant Trusts counterclaimed for rescission of the
transaction between them and Plaintiffs, and brought a Crossclaim
against Defendant McNeil for his negligence.
counterclaimed

for

damages

resulting

Defendants Bradshaw

from

alleged

wrongful

injunction.
A

preliminary

injunction

was

granted

and,

after

a

hearing, the injunction was made permanent pending trial.
Motions were heard and ruled upon by the Court.
parties

engaged

discovery.

There

was

a plenary

The

trial

on

September 24, 25, 29 and 30, 1987, before the Honorable John A.
Rokich.
The Court below found that the written deed mistakenly
varied from the agreement between Defendant Trusts and Grahns,
and granted reformation of the deed.

The Court also ordered

Plaintiffs to pay for the quantity of land in the parcel, as
reformed, which was in excess of 1.11 acres.
that

the

reformed

deed

include

the

The Court ordered

easement

and

that

the

transaction between Defendant Trustee and Defendants Bradshaw be
rescinded.

Plaintiffs

failed

to

prove

a

conspiracy

and,

therefore, their claims based upon such deceit were dismissed.
The Court awarded costs to Plaintiffs, but no attorneys7 fees.

3

The Court also found that McNeil had no duty to Grahns
and therefore dismissed the Plaintiffs' claim based on negligence
of the surveyor.

The Court made no finding on the Gregory claim

against McNeil.
Defendant Trusts have appealed
reformation of the deed.

from the judgment of

Defendant Trusts seek rescission of the

transaction between Plaintiffs and Defendant Trusts.

Defendants

Bradshaw join in that appeal of the judgment of reformation and
also appeal the denial of their claim for damages.

Defendants

Bradshaw have not appealed from the judgment of rescission of the
transaction

by

which

they would

have purchased

the

adjacent

property.
Plaintiffs accept the decision in chief, but do use
this opportunity to respectfully appeal from two particular parts
of the decision.

Plaintiffs submit that the evidence does not

support the order to pay for the difference between the revised
quantity measurement of land and that originally
legal description.

listed

in a

It is also submitted that the Court below

should have awarded attorneys' fees to Plaintiffs.
B.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS RELEVANT TO THE
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Plaintiffs

are

emphatically

dissatisfied

with

the

Statement of Facts presented by Defendant Trusts.
Plaintiffs submit that the said Defendants Statement of
Facts plays

fast

and

loose with
4

the

actual

facts,

contains

numerous

inaccuracies,

irrelevant information.

twists

of evidentiary

material,

and

The Defendants attempt to direct this

Court's attention away from the testimony adduced at trial.

In

place of the evidence, Defendants rely upon an early stipulation
which

represented

an

attempt

to

describe

the

preliminary

understandings of counsel as to the facts. That stipulation

was

submitted to the trial judge solely for the purposes of a hearing
concerning

injunctive

relief,

held within a month after

the

commencement of the action.
Concerning the Stipulation, the facts are as follows.
In December,

1986,

shortly after the action was filed and a

temporary restraining order was issued (Record: the Motion, pages
20-27; Temporary Restraining Order and Order to Show Cause, pages
28-31), a Stipulation of Facts ("Stipulation"), which was drafted
by the attorneys for Defendant Trusts, was submitted
" * * * to assist the Court and the parties to
this stipulation in resolving the issues
relating the outstanding Temporary Restraining
Order and Plaintiffs' Pending Motion for a
Preliminary Injunction against Defendant
Bradshaw continued for hearing on December 15,
1986.
For purposes of said hearing, the
parties represent that they believe the
following facts to be true and that the Court
can accept the following facts as true in
determining the issues now before the Court."
(Record: Stipulation of Facts, pages 40-41.)
[Emphasis supplied]
Without the benefit of discovery or investigation into the facts,
the parties stipulated as to what the facts might be, solely for

5

purposes of considering the injunction.

The Court, in its Order

granting the injunction, acknowledged the limited purpose for the
Stipulation.

(Record:

page 88) .

It is important to note that lengthy discovery and fact
analysis took place after that Stipulation was submitted, and,
further, that all issues were tried below.

The Stipulation was

not used to limit the scope of evidence presented at the trial;
nor was any attempt made to publish or introduce the Stipulation
as evidence.

It was not used at all, after that early hearing.

In fact, at trial, most of the "facts11 once stipulated to for
purposes of that injunction hearing were disproved, qualified by
additional

facts,

or

exposed

as

significantly

incomplete,

inaccurate or misstated.
Despite

these

developments

which

culminated

in

a

plenary trial on the issues, Defendants rely on that preliminary
Stipulation for purposes of their appeal.

Due to their heavy

reliance thereon, the Defendants' Statement of Facts creates a
misleading picture of the case which was actually considered by
the Trial Court.
Because of the confusion thus created by the Brief of
Defendant Trusts, it is important to this Court's consideration
of this Appeal that an extraordinary effort be made to clear the
air and to present a straight-forward, accurate statement of the
relevant

facts.

In

Addendum
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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, AND RULES
Respondents cite no such determinative laws.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
In addition to those issues identified in the Briefs of
Appellants, Respondents present the following issues:
1.

Did the Trial Court err when it ruled that Grahns

should be required to pay Gregory for the quantity over 1.11
acres in Parcel 1 land after the reformation of the deed?
2.

Should the Court have awarded Grahns attorneys'

fees?
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
There were two distinct mistakes made by the parties in
this matter; 1) a mutual mistake in the legal description in the
property purchased by Grahns from Defendant Trusts, and 2) a
unilateral mistake by the Trustee of Defendant Trusts as to the
effect of the Grahn sale upon them.
Both parties intended that Grahns receive certain land,
including the Private Drive, but the deed's description varied,
by mistake, from that intent.

Reformation of the deed is both

equitably and legally appropriate.

6(a)

Rescission,

on the other hand,

is not appropriate^

Gregory did not promptly and unequivocally elect rescission upon
discovery of the mistake.

Further by the standards set for

rescission by Utah case law (whether for unilateral or mutual
mistake),

rescission was not available as a remedy under the

facts and circumstances.
Contrary to the argument of Gregory, the provisions of
the agreement between two parties is not merged into a final deed
if it is mistaken.

This principle is the very essence of the

equity remedy of reformation.
It is well settled Utah law that the main objective of
a court in construing a deed is to determine the intent of the
parties from the language used in the deed.

In the case at bar,

the intention of the parties, as demonstrated in the contract,
the legal descriptions and other evidence, was clearly that the
Private Drive was to have been included within the boundaries of
the land sold to the Grahns.
Defendants Bradshaw did not appeal the Order of the
Trial Court which rescinded their purchase of Parcel Two from
Gregory.

As such, Bradshaws have no property interest and no

cause of action for the relief which they seek on appeal.
In any event, as a result of the Bradshaws' actual
notice, and knowledge of the mistake in th€> deed description
prior to their closing, Bradshaws were not bona fide purchasers

6(b)

and could not cut off Grahns' right of reformation.
the

evidence

showed

that

Bradshaws never had

Furthermore,

an

enforceable

agreement with Rocky Mountain Refractories and could not have
been damaged by the preliminary injunction granted by the Trial
Court.

The evidence showed that the injunction was proper in

every respect.
Reformation of the deed to Parcel One provided Grahns
the exact property as intended by the parties to the sale.

The

price was not based on acreage, but was for that parcel.

The

parties clearly intended the entire amount of land in Parcel One
(including

the

Private

Drive)

to

be

sold

for

the

original

purchase price as agreed and there should have been no award for
additional compensation

for the final acreage reflected

as a

result of the reformation of the legal description.
The Defendant Trusts, in closing the sale of Parcel Two
to the Bradshaws upon different terms and conditions than offered
to the Grahns under their option agreement, breached said option
agreement and,

as such,

should be responsible to Grahns for

attorneys' fees, as provided in their contract.

The Trial Court

erred in failing to award Grahns attorneys' fees in connection
with that breach.

6(c)

therefore, identified the misstated and disproved "facts11 which
were

alleged,

affirmatively
before

the

anew,

on

submit,

Trial

this Appeal.

below,

Court.

Plaintiffs

elect

the facts as they were

The

Addendum

and

the

to

adduced

Plaintiffs

Statement of Facts are both important to an understanding of the
issues.
misled

Without that information, the Court of Appeals could be
into

considering

a

case

much

different

than

that

considered by the trial judge.
Grahns
Justices of the

respectfully

solicit

the

indulgence

of

the

Court of Appeals in the extraordinary length of

this Statement of Facts.

It is only by this method that a clear

starting point can be created.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

FOUNDATION.
a.

Defendant

Trusts,

owners

of the real

property

which made up the estate at 2811 Brookburn Road, entered into a
listing agreement with broker Noel Taylor for the sale of the
property.

(Transcript:

Noel Taylor, page 4, lines 6-13; page

26, lines 9-10, lines 21-25; Mrs. Gregory page 154, lines 6-21.)
b.
assist

In 1984, a surveyor, Mr. McNeil, was hired to

in an

approximate

effort

half

to divide

(1/2)

acre

from the

parcel

Brookburn

to be

deeded

estate
to

an

Barbara

Danielson, a beneficiary of the Defendant Trusts. (Transcript:

7

Mrs. Gregory, page 156, lines 4-13; Danielson, page 419, lines
11-25 —

please note:

the transcript mistakenly identifies the

year as 1964, rather than 1984,)
c.

Mr. McNeil was instructed by Barbeira Danielson,

with the knowledge and cooperation of trustee Gregory, to provide
a topographic survey of the Brookburn estate sufficient to enable
them to locate the existing house. He was also directed to divide
off a half (1/2) acre parcel in the "southeast corner".-

He was

told to locate and stake such a parcel (referring to the Private
Drive as "the road",
" * * * to the south and east off the road,
use the road as the boundary."
(Transcript:
McNeil, page 222, lines 7-21, quoting lines 20
and 21. See also page 228, lines 14-17; 229,
lines 19-20; page 235, lines 16-22; Danielson,
page 419, lines 2-8; Mrs. Gregory, page
156-157)
The resultant survey was introduced into evidence as Plaintiffs'
Exhibit " 1 " .

(Transcript:

McNeil, page 221; Mrs. Gregory, page

156.)
d.

There were no contingency instructions, because

there was no question that a half

(1/2) acre parcel could be

divided from the estate using the southeast side of the driveway
as a boundary.

(Transcript, page 246, lines 8-18; page 475,

lines 20-24.)

8

2.

THE MISTAKE.
a.

When Mr.

McNeil prepared the legal

description

which he set forth on that survey (Exhibit 1-P) , he intended to
describe
Private

a parcel
Drive,

of

with

land

situated

on the east

its edge as the boundary,

one-half (1/2) acre in size.

(Transcript:

side of the
approximately

page 475, lines 9-18)

Q.
[By Mr. Adams] When she first hired you
she instructed you, did she not, to see if
there was a buildable lot on the east side of
the driveway?
A.
[By Mr. McNeil] She instructed us to
survey off a half-acre parcel on the east side
of the driveway.
(Transcript: page 475, lines 4-8.
lines 12-17.)
b.

See also Danielson, page 420,

In preparing the description, Mr. McNeil and his

crew made a four (4) degree error at the point of describing the
turn where

the

Brookburn

Road

intersects

the

Private

Drive.

(Transcript: McNeil, page 224, lines 17-21, and pages 224-228 for
testimony describing the error with reference to Exhibit 1-P and
marks made thereon.)
c.

The

effect

of

the

error

is

that

the

legal

description to that new, undeveloped parcel made a call to the
easterly side of the existing Private Drive (Transcript page 463,
lines 14-25), but identified the incorrect number of feet to that
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call, missing by fifteen (15) feet at that point,.

(Transcript

page 454, lines 9-22; subsequent pages indicating mathematical
ramifications of error.)
3.

SELLING THE PROPERTY,
a.

The property was listed by Gregory on behalf of

the Defendant Trusts, with Noel Taylor.

(It had been conveyed to

Barbara Danielson, and then re-conveyed back to the Defendant
Trusts.

Transcript: Mrs.

Danielson, pages 429-420.)

Gregory,

page

157,

lines

10-16;

Mr. Gregory was the trustee but Mrs.

Gregory communicated on behalf of the sellers as well.

They

informed Mr. Taylor that, although the property was listed as a
single parcel, since it had been divided, either parcel could be
purchased.

He was directed and authorized to advise potential

buyers that the survey stakes placed along the east side of the
driveway would indicate the boundary between the two parcels and
to assure any buyer of the larger parcel that the Private Drive
was to go with it, to provide access to the house.

(Transcript:

N. Taylor, pages 4-5; page 6, lines 12-22; page 8, lines 18-22;
page 13, lines 3-12; page 33, lines 8-20; page 34, lines 12-14.
Mrs. Gregory, page 155, lines 22-25.)
"* * * and we all understood that the property
would be sold to whomever; if they couldn't
buy the entire property, it would be as
staked."
(Transcript: N. Taylor, page 34,
lines 12-14.)
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b.

At trial, the larger parcel, with the residence

situated on it was identified as Parcel One,
on

the

south

and

east

side,

was

The smaller parcel,

identified

as

Parcel

Two,

(Transcript: Court, page 60, lines 8-10.)
c.

The

Grahns

were

exposed

contacted Noel Taylor in regard to it.

to

the

property

and

(Transcript: N. Taylor,

pages 5-6.)
4.

REPRESENTATIONS.
a.

Noel Taylor showed the property to the Grahns, and

advised them that one of the two parcels could be purchased, and
identified for them the boundaries of the property.

(Transcript:

N. Taylor, page 6, lines 4-21; Mrs. Grahn, pages 56-57.)

Despite

snowy conditions of the property, Noel Taylor uncovered survey
stakes on the south and east side of the driveway to demonstrate
and represent that boundary line.

(Transcript: Mrs. Grahn, page

57, lines 5-9.)
b.
them

Representations were made to the Grahns to show

the other physical

river.

boundaries,

including

the

(Transcript: N. Taylor, page 8, lines 2-4.

fence and

Mrs. Grahn,

page 140, lines 8-9.)
c.

The

Grahns

sought

assurances

in regard

to

the

physical boundaries of the land on numerous occasions, from Noel
Taylor as well as Gregory, and discussed the details in regard
thereto.

In fact, Noel Taylor testified that the Grahns
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» * * * were very explicit on making sure they
did purchase the roadway, because they did not
want to detract from the beauty of the
property.
From that standpoint we did, on
several occasions, walk the entire perimeters
of the property * * * . tf
(Quoted language,
Noel Taylor, page 7, line 25, page 8, lines
1-4;
See also Transcript: Mrs. Gregory, page 161, lines 11-19;

page

162, lines 10-13; Mrs. Grahn, pages 85-86.)
d.

Mrs. Gregory even informed Mrs. Grahn that she had

had prior experiences
driveway,

involving problems with ownership of a

and assured Mrs. Grahn that the driveway was to be

owned by the owner of Parcel One, and to serve as access to that
parcel.

(Transcript: Mrs. Grahn, page 85, lines 2 3-25, page 86,

lines 1-3; Mrs. Gregory, page 162, lines 14-21.)
5.

INTENTIONS/AGREEMENT.
a.

Even prior to the sale to the Grahns,

Barbara

Danielson intended to build on Parcel Two, but leave the driveway
to the residence to the owner of Parcel One.

(Transcript:

Noel

Taylor, page 5, lines 16-20.)
b.

The

Grahns,

in

submitting

an

Earnest

Money

Agreement to purchase Parcel One, intended that the driveway be
included therein.

(Transcript: N. Taylor, page 51, line 25, page

52, and page 53, lines 1-2; Mrs. Grahn, page 61, lines 18-23;
page 62, lines 2-24; Mr. Grahn, page 395, lines 8-11.)
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c.

Gregory also intended that the Private Drive be

sold to the Grahns as part of Parcel One.

(Transcript:

Mr.

Gregory, page 301, lines 5-9; 354, lines 4-15; Mrs. Gregory, page
162, lines 10-12.)
d.

The Grahns were not concerned about the size of

either Parcel One or Parcel Two, but were concerned with the
physical boundaries which had been agreed to.

(Transcript: Mr.

Grahn, page 395, lines 8-15; Mrs. Grahn, page 58, lines 1-8; page
140, lines 8-15; Exhibit 2-P.

See also testimony of N. Taylor,

especially pages 5-10, and 31-34, which indicates that, due to
the unique nature
quantity,

rather

of the property,
than

physical

concern

about

measurable

boundaries,

would

have

been

18,

1986,

and

unusual.)
e.

The

Grahns

submitted

on March

Gregory later accepted and executed an earnest money agreement.
The earnest money agreement was entered into evidence as Exhibit
"2-P11.
6.

(Transcript: Mrs. Grahn, page 61, lines 1-10.)

SOURCE OF LEGAL DESCRIPTION.
a.

As her attorney prepared a proposed draft of an

earnest money agreement for the Grahns, Mrs. Grahn sought to find
a legal description of Parcel One to attach to the earnest money
agreement form.

She called Mrs. Gregory for one, and was advised

that the description could be found on the tax notice.

Rather

than drive to the Gregory home for a copy of the tax notice,
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since she was at that time in downtown Salt Lake City, Mrs. Grahn
visited the Salt Lake County offices, and was directed to the
Salt Lake County Recorder's Office where she obtained a copy of
the legal description,
b.

(Transcript:

Mrs. Grahn, pages 83-84.)

The Salt Lake County Recorder, apparently, used

the legal description from the Danielson deed for Parcel Two as a
basis for forming a legal description for Parcel One.

This was

the source of the legal description which Mrs. Grahn picked up.
(Transcript:

Mr. Gregory, page 343, lines 8-13; Mrs. Grahn,

pages 83-84.)
c.

Mr.

McNeil

testified

that

the

Grahn

legal

description, as a result of the mistake and the €>fforts by the
Recorder without
follow.

knowledge

of the mistake,

was difficult

In fact, to a surveyor, he testified, it is clear that

the description is mistaken in what it conveys.
McNeil, pages 458, lines 8-20;
7.

to

(Transcript:

and 478, lines 19-25.)

DOCUMENTATION.
a.

The Earnest Money Sales Agreement,

referred

to

above, stated that ingress and egress to the property was made by
a private easement, which the parties understood as a reference
to the Private Drive.

(Transcript:

N. Taylor, pages 12-13; Mrs.

Grahn, page 61, lines 11-25, page 62, line 1.)
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b.
provided

The earnest money agreement, referred to above,

for an easement

for an aesthetic break between

the

properties as well as geologic protection against erosion, which
easement would extend into Parcel Two
11

* * * from any point within fifteen (15)
feet of the existing drive which separates the
two lots, * * * ."
(Transcript: N. Taylor,
page 52, lines 12-14; Exhibit 2-P, Exhibit A,
page 4.)
c.

The Grahns and Gregory closed on the purchase and

sale of Parcel One on or about August 1, 1986.

(Transcript:

Mrs. Grahn, page 63, lines 23-25, page 64, line 1.)
8.

DISCOVERY OF THE MISTAKE.
a.

Having

entered

into

an

Earnest

Money

Sales

Agreement to purchase Parcel Two with Gregory, Defendant Dean
Bradshaw discovered evidence which led to the discovery of the
mistake on October 11, 1986.
his discovery and,
(Transcript:

thereupon,

He advised Gregory and McNeil of
McNeil discovered the mistake.

Mrs. Gregory, pages 169-172; Mr. Gregory, pages

312-313; McNeil, page 224, lines 6-21.)
b.

McNeil advised Bradshaws and Gregory of the affect

of the mistake.

(Transcript:

McNeil, pages 229-230.)

He had

made a four degree error in turning a corner in the survey.
Although the description accurately identified the arc of the
Private Drive, due to the mistaken angular measurement, it failed
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to accurately identify the southeast side of that drive, as had
been intended.

(Transcript:

McNeil pages 227, lines 15-16; 245,

lines 9-19; 453-454, lines 20-25, 1-22; 477, lines 16-22.)
c.

Within two days of the discovery, McNeil submitted

to Gregory a new survey which would reform the description to
fulfill the instructions which he had been given*

This survey

identified a half (1/2) acre lot on the south and east side of
the

Private

boundaries.

Drive,

using

the

Private

Drive

as

one

of

the

(Transcript: McNeil, page 229, lines 14-25; page

476, lines 1-9; Mr. Gregory, page 316, lines 18-25, page 317,
lines 1-4.)
lf

12-P".

This survey was received into evidence as Exhibit

(Transcript, page 173.)
d.

Dissatisfied

with that suggestion,

Gregory

and

Bradshaws sought a drawing showing the effect of the description
of Parcel Two without regard to the Private Drive.

(Transcript:

McNeil, page 230-231; Mr. Gregory, page 317, lines 5-23, page
318, lines 20-25.)

This drawing was received as Exhibit "9-P".

(Transcript, page 75)
9.

SUPPRESSION OF MISTAKE.
a.

additional
property.

Grahns,
survey

on October

work

around

11,

the

1986,

Private

became

aware of

Drive

on

their

Within a couple of days they saw circles drawn by

surveyors on the driveway.

They therefore telephoned Gregorys to

inquire as to the meaning.

They were
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finally

able to make

contact

on the Thursday

following

October

11,

1986.

Herold

Gregory, when questioned, refrained from advising Mrs. Grahn of
the

discovery

which

had

been

made

on

October

11,

information which he had gained since that date, and

or

the

instead

explained the stakes and circles as an effort to reseat stakes
which had been pulled up by children and then further reassured
her not to worry, because the Grahns still owned the driveway.
(Transcript: Mrs. Grahn, pages 70-72.)
b.

Despite their discovery of the mistake and its

effect of making the prior survey

(Exhibit

fl

l-Plf) unreliable,

Gregory and Bradshaws did not advise Salt Lake County that the
survey which they had submitted in connection with an application
for lot approval was incorrect, or that there was the potential
for a dispute concerning the driveway which served Parcel One.
To the time of trial, the county had not been advised in that
regard.

(Transcript:

Reynolds, page 249, lines 14-22; pages

268-269.)
10.

BRADSHAW PURCHASE OF PARCEL 2.
a.

Bradshaws

were

very

familiar

with

the

real

property at Brookburn in that they had been looking at it even
before

the Grahns

first visit,

had

returned

to

consider

it

frequently, and had thought about it a great deal by the time the
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Grahns purchased the property on August 1, 1986.

(Transcript: N.

Taylor, pages 13-14; Mr. Bradshaw, page 213, lines 11-13; page
400, lines 14-15; Mrs. Bradshaw, page 364, lines 17-24.)
b.

Bradshaws had been advised, as had other potential

buyers, that the south and east side of the Private Drive served
as the boundary between the two parcels.

(Transcript: N. Taylor,

page 14, lines 6-11; page 42, lines 23-25; Mrs. Bradshaw, page
390, lines 4-9.)
c.
Grahns

had

Bradshaws had been advised and were aware that the
purchased

the

improved

portion

of

the

property

including the home thereon, and that they believed that they were
the owners of the Private Drive.

Bradshaws were further aware of

the easement in favor of the Grahns along the south and east side
of the Private Drive.

(Transcript: Mr. Bradshaw, page 214, lines

4-23; Mrs. Gregory, page 184, lines 24-25, page 18 5, lines 1-12;
Mrs. Bradshaw, page 367, lines 17-19; page 374, lines 14-17, page
385, line 9; and pages 388-389.)
d.

Bradshaws, on or about October 11, 1986, became

aware of the mistake in the survey and legal description which
had been made by McNeil, and during the next few days, learned of
its ramifications.
problem

for more

Accordingly,
than

forty

days
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Bradshaws were aware of the
before

their

closing

with

Gregory,

and before the Grahns were made aware of the same.

(Transcript: Mr. Gregory, pages 312-313; Mr. Bradshaw, page 399,
lines 14-17.)
e.

On November 20, 1986, the Bradshaws and Defendant

Trusts closed their agreement to purchase and sell Parcel Two
according to the legal description
written by McNeil.

(Transcript:

as originally,

mistakenly

Mr. Bradshaw, page 215, lines

1-4.)
f.

At that time, Bradshaws and Gregory also entered

into a side agreement, labeled Exhibit

lf

13-Pfl and introduced into

evidence at trial, which acknowledged a mistake and potential
dispute in regard to the property line between Parcel One and
Parcel Two, and provided, further that:
"In the event that buyer cannot obtain the
full .56 acre according to the legal
description, seller agrees to nullify sale and
refund purchase price."
(Quotation cited:
Mary Ethel Gregory reading from the exhibit,
page 179, lines 2-4.)
(Transcript: Mrs. Gregory, pages 178-179, lines 12-25, 1-11, page
196, lines 16-22; Mrs. Bradshaw, page 384, lines 4-13; 387, lines
15-25.)
g.

Prior

to

closing,

but

after

discovery

of

the

mistake, Gregory had provided Bradshaws numerous opportunities to
back out of their agreement to purchase Parcel Two.
had in each case declined.

(Transcript:

lines 18-22; page 407, lines 2-8.)
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Bradshaws

Mr. Bradshaw, page 399,

11.

DISCLOSURE OF THE MISTAKE.
a.

On Friday, November 21, 1986, (after closing with

Bradshaws) Gregory met with Grahns to advise them of the mistake.
Gregory advised them that they could pick one of two options:
rescission or to allow Gregory to construct a new driveway on a
different part of Parcel One.

(Transcript:

Mrs. Grahn, pages

73-76; Exhibit 8-P; Mr. Gregory, page 323.)
b.

Grahns were shown McNeil's drawing (Exhibit "9-P")

which would indicate how the mistaken description of Parcel Two
would

cross the Private Drive, but were not advised of or shown

McNeil's proposed survey to correct the problem, reforming the
property lines consistent with his directions, which survey was
Exhibit

lf

12-Pff.
c.

(Transcript: Mrs. Grahn, page 75-76.)
Grahns asked for time to consider that of which

they had just been informed.

(Transcript:

Mrs.

Grahn,

page

76-77; Mr. Gregory, page 323, lines 20-21.)
12.

THE THREAT.
a.

On Friday, November 21st, the Grahns were pressed

by Mr. Bradshaw; and then during the evening of Sunday, November
2 3rd,

had

a conversation with Mr.

Bradshaw during which

he

indicated his intent to break ground immediately, implying that
he would do so on their driveway, and also advising them of his
unwillingness to wait for them to consider their alternatives.
(Transcript:

Mrs. Grahn, pages 77-79.)
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b.
stop

him,

Mr. Bradshaw advised them that, if they desired to
they

(Transcript:

would

have

to

seek

an

order

of

the

court,

Mrs. Grahn, page 78, lines 18-25, page 79, line 1;

see also pages 134-135.)
13.

THE LAWSUIT.
a.

suit

Seeing no alternative, Plaintiffs sought to file

on Monday,

restraining order.

November

24,

and

(Transcript:

also

sought

a

temporary

Mrs. Grahn, page 79, lines

11-15; Record pages 2-32.)
14.

THE OPTION.
a.

from

In connection with their purchase of the property

Defendant

Trusts,

Grahns

obtained

an

Option

Purchase/First Right of Refusal in regard to Parcel Two.

to

Among

other things, the Option provided that, should Grahns fail to
exercise their right after an opportunity, and
"should the offer be amended making the terms
more favorable * * * then the said amendment
or offer shall be, once again, subject to the
terms of this provision.11
(Transcript: Mrs.
Gregory, page 210, lines 2-15; Mrs. Grahn,
page 63, lines 1-12; N. Taylor, page 7, lines
20-24.)
b.

After entering

into an Earnest Money

Agreement

with Bradshaws, Gregory extended an option opportunity to Grahns,
which

the

Grahns

declined

to

accept
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because

they

could

not

perform within the two (2) week period which the Earnest Money
Agreement called for.

(Transcript:

Mrs. Grahn, pages 67-68;

Exhibit 7-P; Mrs. Gregory, pages 165-166.)
c.

The Bradshaws did not close within that two (2)

week period, but, by agreement or understanding between Bradshaws
and Gregory,

extended their rights to close at a later date.

Gregory did not offer to the Grahns a new opportunity to close at
a later date.

(Transcript:

Mrs. Gregory, page 166, lines 2-19;

Mrs. Grahn, page 87, lines 2-9.)
d.
which

The terms of the opportunity did not describe land

crossed

the

Private

Drive,

nor provide

that

the

Side

Agreement referred to above would be part of the arrangement for
the purchase of Parcel Two.

The Grahns were not extended a new

opportunity to purchase under those terms.

(Transcript:

Mrs.

Gregory, pages 178-179; Mrs. Grahn, page 87, lines 10-21.)
OTHER FACTS THE COURT SHOULD NOTE
In addition to the key facts and evidence identified
above, with citations to the record and transcript, there was
certain evidence of which this Court should be advised.
especially

true

in

this

case

that

a

full

reading

It is
of

the

transcript will place the Justices of this Court in a position to
consider the legal arguments which relate to the contest between
the parties

primarily

concerning

the

issue

of

reformation.

Certain evidence was adduced before the Court which relates to
22

those key issues, the existence of which should be made familiar
to the Court.

They

are

identified,

succinctly,

below with

citations to the transcript and record.
15.

Gregory was intimately familiar with both parcels

of the property in question.

(Transcript: Mr. Gregory, pages

287-288; Danielson, pages 415-417.)
16.
the

time

Bradshaws were very familiar with the property by

they

submitted

their

Earnest

Money

proposal.

(Transcript: Mr. Bradshaw, page 213, lines 3-13; Mrs. Bradshaw,
page 364, lines 17-24; Mr. Bradshaw, page 400, lines 10-17; N.
Taylor, pages 13-14.)
17.

Parcel Two (after reformation) is a buildable lot.

(Transcript: McNeil, page 476, lines 6-9; Reynolds, page 251,
lines 24-25, page 252, lines 1-8; page 264-265; McNeil, 242-243.)
18.

The Grahns cannot be placed in the status quo, if

rescission was to be considered.

(Transcript: Mrs. Grahn, pages

64-65.)
19.

The Court visited the property.

(Transcript: page

81, lines 3-11.)
20.

By

the

surveyor's

analysis,

using

the

legal

descriptions for Parcels One and Two, and without reformation,
there may very well have been a "no-man's land" between
parcels which included part of the Private Drive.
McNeil, page 465, lines 13-17.)
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the

(Transcript:

BRADSHAWS' FACTS
(Grahns do not accept the additional facts, as alleged
by

Bradshaws

in

their

Brief,

and

offer

the

following

in

qualifications thereto.)
21.
enforceable

Defendant
agreement

Bradshaws
with

Rocky

failed

to

Mountain

enter

into

an

Refractories.

(Transcript: Mr. Ostler, pages 493-497.)
22.

Bradshaws

commence construction.

did

not obtain

a building

permit

to

(Transcript: Mr. Bradshaw, pages 406-407,

lines 19-25.)
23.

Contrary to the allegation in paragraph 48, page 5

of Bradshaws' Brief, Mr. Ostler did not testify as indicated.

In

fact, he testified that he never figured out how much concrete or
aggregate would be needed

(transcript: page 490,

line 2) or

arrived at a price (page 490, lines 9-18), and that he would have
needed cooperation from a cement company, but had not come to an
understanding in that regard, either (pages 495-497).
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ARGUMENT
I
TWO DISTINCT MISTAKES WERE MADE BY THE PARTIES;
a.

a mutual mistake in the legal description of

the property purchased by Grahns from Defendant Trusts, and
b.

a unilateral mistake by the Defendant Trusts

as to the effect of the agreement upon them.
Despite the positioning and posturing in the Brief of
Defendants, the evidence adduced before the Trial Court revealed
two separate, distinct mistakes.
between Grahns and Gregory.

One mistake was mutual, as

The other was a unilateral mistake

made by Gregory.
THE MUTUAL MISTAKE concerned the legal description.
Grahns

and

Gregory

agreed

that

the

Private

Driveway

on

the

property was to be conveyed to the Grahns as a part of Parcel
One.

All parties understood at closing that the driveway was

part of that which was being bought and sold.
intended otherwise.
Transcript,

above.)

It was never

(See Statements of Fact and citations to the
All of the following was established by

clear and convincing evidence, and in fact was uncontroverted:
1.
Parcels One and Two were created from a
single parcel, which was divided before Grahns entered the
picture.
(Transcript:
testimony of Noel Taylor, pages
4-5.)
2.
Mr. McNeil prepared a survey of Parcel Two,
with a legal description, and survey stakes were placed on
25

the property, especially along the south and eastern side of
the Private Drive, to indicate the location of the boundary
line between the parcels. (Transcript: testimony of McNeil,
pages 221-222.)
3.
The listing agent for Gregory was instructed
after the creation of the survey to advise potential buyers
as to the option that one or the other of the parcels could
be purchased, and of the boundary between them.
Noel
Taylor, the agent, testified that
" * * * w e all understood that the
property would be sold to whomever; if
they couldn't buy the entire property, it
would be as staked." *
(Transcript: testimony of Taylor, page 8, lines 19-22, page
28, lines 1-2; and page 34, lines 1-5, lines 12-14 —
*quoted above.
See also testimony of Mrs. Gregory, page
155-156,
lines 16-25,
1-3; and testimony of Barbara
Danielson, page 241, lines 23-25.)
4.
Grahns were shown the stakes along the south
and eastern side of the driveway and were told of the
boundaries by Noel Taylor and by Gregory on separate
occasions.
(Transcript:
testimony of Mrs. Grahn, pages
56-57; of Noel Taylor, page 6, lines 10-22; Mrs. Gregory,
page 161, lines 11-14.)
5.
Mrs. Grahn had seen an overhead photo of the
property in the county offices indicating the boundaries of
the lot which they intended to purchase, which were the same
as the stakes.
(Transcript: testimony of Mrs. Grahn, page
141, lines 20-25.)
6.
The Grahns carefully sought information in
regard to the boundaries, and made clear their intention and
desire that the driveway was part of Parcel One.
Noel
Taylor testified that the Grahns
" * * * were very explicit on making sure
they did purchase the roadway, because
they did not want to detract from the
beauty of the property.
From that
standpoint we did, on several occasions,
walk the entire perimeters of the
property
* * * ."
(Transcript:
testimony of Noel Taylor, pages 7-8,
lines 25, 1-4.)
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7.
In the Earnest Money Agreement, Exhibit
2-P lf , the parties referred to access to the residence
by a Private Easement, intending that the reference be
to the Private Drive.
(Transcript: testimony of Mrs.
Grahn, page 61, lines 11-23; Noel Taylor, page 50, lines
n

6-8.)

8.
Also in the Earnest Money Agreement, the
parties referred to the Private Drive as the boundary
between Parcel One and Parcel Two in connection with
describing an easement to be granted along the Private
Drive on the side of Parcel Two.
(Transcript:
testimony of Noel Taylor, pages 51-53; Mrs. Grahn, page
62, lines 8-24.)
9.
Gregory believed that the Private
Driveway was part of Parcel One, and represented the
same to be true.
(Transcript:
testimony of Mr.
Gregory, page 354, lines 4-15; Noel Taylor, page 5,
lines 7-15; Mrs. Gregory, page 162, lines 6-21.)
10. Gregory intended to sell the driveway as
part of Parcel One. (Transcript:
testimony of Mr.
Gregory, pages 300-301, lines 25, 1-9.)
11. Gregory even gratuitously represented to
the Grahns, after closing, that the Grahns, as owners of
Parcel One, owned the driveway.
(Remark made in
response to October 11, 1986, inquiry by Grahns as to
meaning of new surveyor markings.)
(Transcript:
testimony of Mrs. Grahn, pages 70-72.)
Further, when
finally disclosing the discovery of the mistake to
Grahns, on November 21, 1986, Gregory acknowledged that
they had thought the Private Drive to be part of Grahn's
property.
(Transcript: testimony of Mr. Gregory, page
323, lines 13-14.)
The legal description used by Grahns and Gregory at
closing was mistaken.

(Transcript:

224, lines 17-21, pages 224-228.)

Testimony of McNeil, page

The description had apparently

been drawn by a Salt Lake County employee from Mr. McNeil's legal
description of Parcel Two, which had appeared on the deed from
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the

Defendant

Trusts

to

Barbara

Danielson.

(Transcript:

testimony of Mr. Gregory, page 343, lines 12-13,)
by Mr. McNeil,

As indicated

(Transcript: page 458, lines 8-20; 478, lines

19-25) it was not clear what the legal description described, but
it was

clearly

mistaken.

The

legal

description

accurately

refers to the arc of the Private Drive, but due to the mistaken
angular measurement, fails to accurately identify the existing
south and east side of the Private Drive, as was intended.
There

is

no

doubt

that

both

Grahns

and

Gregory

intended, at the time that they respectively purchased and sold
the property, that Parcel One would contain the Private Drive
which

had

historically

served

as

a means

of

access

to

the

residence on the property.
[The Justices of this Court are respectfully urged to
take notice of the fact that the property in question is very
unique property in the Salt Lake Valley.
the

surveys

in

the

record

will

appreciation, but only a little.
judge visited the property.
evidence.

(Transcript:

is a long,

A thoughtful review of

help

in

creating

that

It was important that the trial

The property, itself, thereby became

page 81, lines 3-11.)

winding drive through a steep,

The Private Drive
thickly

vegetated

terrain to an old estate home nestled next to a stream.]
THE UNILATERAL MISTAKE.
Q.
[Mr. Woodbury] So, this was the original
survey you had on the property; is that
correct?
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A.

[Mr. Gregory]

Correct

Q.
And this was the survey that you were
relying on when you gave the instruction to
Mr. Taylor to divide the property, to offer
the property to be divided; is that correct?
A.

That's right.

Q.
And is it my understanding from your
previous testimony that if you would have
known that this was not correct, you wouldn't
have given him that instruction?
Is that
correct?
A.

We never would have divided it.

(Transcript: Mr.
5-17.)

Gregory,

page

316,

lines

The Gregorys each testified that it was their belief
that Parcel Two, as it was situated on the southeast side of the
Private Drive, contained a quantity of land equal to or greater
than

one-half

(1/2)

acre.

(Transcript:

Testimony

of Mr.

Gregory, page 300, lines 11-12; testimony of Mrs. Gregory, page
209, lines 1-10; pages 156-157.)

That was the direction which

was given to Mr. McNeil, the surveyor.
No.

2.a.,

slightly
according

above.)

less

than

In

fact,

one-half

however,
(1/2)

of

Parcel
an

acre

Two
as

contained
determined

to the intention of the parties and/or the call to the

Private Drive as the boundary.
that Parcel Two,
one-hundredths
acre.

(See Statement of Facts,

It was estimated by Mr. McNeil

under those circumstances,

would have

(5/100) of an acre less than a full half

(Transcript: Mr. McNeil, page 460, lines 15-16.)
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five
(1/2)

The concern of Gregory in the quantity of land related
to its "buildability".
11-17.)
county

(Transcript: Mr. Gregory, page 300, lines

The minimum size for a building lot in that zone of the
was

one-half

(Transcript:

(1/2) an acre,

except with

a variance.

Reynolds, page 249, line 19.)

In relation to this issue, the Gregorys testified that
they would not have divided the land into two parcels had they
learned that they could not place a half (1/2) acre parcel on the
south

and

eastern

side

of the

Private

Drive.

(Transcript:

Testimony of Mr. Gregory, page 301, lines 17-21;

testimony of

Mrs. Gregory, page 18 5, lines 2 2-24.)

It is important to note,

however, that there is no evidence that a half acre lot could not
be placed thereon; and that there is no evidence that Gregorys
would have crossed the Private Drive under those circumstances to
create a one-half acre parcel.

As to the latter point, Mrs.

Gregory testified, instead, that it was their desire to keep the
driveway as part of Parcel One.

(Transcript:

Testimony of Mrs.

Gregory, page 162, lines 6-21; see also page 183, lines 5-8.)
On

the

other

hand,

the

Grahns

themselves with the size of Parcel Two.

5.d.,

hereinabove.)

There

was

not

concern

They were not concerned

with the quantity of land even in Parcel One.
Facts

did

no

(See Statement of
evidence

that

the

quantity of land in Parcel Two was an issue in the negotiations,
understanding or agreement between Gregorys and Grahns in regard
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to the purchase and sale of Parcel One.

Gregorys did not bargain

with Grahns in regard to the split of the land; they offered it
to the Grahns as an already divided parcel, and showed the Grahns
the boundaries which it was to have,

according to its legal

description.
It is also clear from a reading of the record, that the
mistaken

belief

of

the

Gregorys

concerned

not

the

specific

quantity of the land, but, instead, that one be able to build a
home upon Parcel 2.

They concluded in part by strict reference

to the zoning requirement that, with less than half
acre, it was not buildable.
Court was that,
buildable

with

(1/2) an

However, the testimony before the

a variance,

the

lot would

be

just

as

(it was the same size) as it had been before it was

determined that the quantity of land was slightly less than half
(1/2) an acre.

(See Statement of Facts 17.)

A steeply sloped

parcel next to the Private Drive (see Exhibit " 1 " , Topographical
Survey for a rough representation); the more level portion of
Parcel 2 was that portion of the property furthest away from the
Private Drive, on the south and east side of the parcel.

Both

Warren Reynolds, Chief Senior Planner of the Planning and Zoning
Board

of

Salt

Lake

County,

and

Mr.

McNeil,

the

surveyor,

testified as to their belief that the remaining property, as is,
was buildable.
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It

is

clear,

then,

that

the

Gregorys

incorrectly

concluded that the lot was not buildable because of their focus
upon the Bradshaw plans for a house, which would not fit on the
property.
About a week later - - well, I explained to
them what the problem was and as best I could,
and about a week later they came back and
said, "This won't do. This doesn't help us.
Now Bradshaw's house does not fit on the
property."
(Transcript: McNeil, page 230, lines 1-5.)
Bradshaw planned a three-story mansion, including cin attic, with
sixteen hundred (1,600) square feet on each floor, rectangular in
shape, one side of which would reach all the way to the Private
Drive.

(Transcript: Mr. Bradshaw, pages 405-406, lines 24-25,

1-7, significantly supplemented by pages 413-414, lines 12-25,
1-7.)
It is submitted that a cooperative alliance in this
litigation

was

formed

between

Gregorys

and

Bradshaws,

in

opposition to the Grahns, and that that alliance has apparently
blindly been kept.

The Defendant's attorneys have worked closely

together, as was apparent at trial and continues to be apparent
in the presentation of briefs.

The attorneys for the Defendants

are members of the same law firm.

The Gregorys believed, and may

still believe, that they had a deal with Bradshaws upon which
they were bound to perform.

(Transcript: Mrs. Gregory, page 17 6,
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lines 4-6.)

There is no evidence in the transcript to indicate

that the Gregorys understood that they could get out of that
deal.
It is submitted, respectfully, that, in regard to the
unilateral mistake of the Gregorys, and despite their arguments,
this

is

not

a

case

of

impracticality

performance of their part of a bargain.

or

impossibility

There is no evidence of

grave consequence as a result of their perceived,
mistake

as

to

the

buildability

of

of

Parcel

Two.

unilateral
Except

for

testimony in regard to the effect upon the Bradshaw plans, and
their expressions of frustration as to their conclusion, that it
was

unbuildable,

there

is no

evidence

to

support

Gregorys

position.
II
REFORMATION OF THE DEED WAS AN APPROPRIATE EQUITABLE REMEDY
Plaintiffs Grahn sought, and were awarded reformation
of the deed to conform with the intention of the parties that
Parcel One include the Private Drive.

The Gregorys sought, and

on appeal, continue to seek, an order instead to rescind the
transaction as between Grahns and Gregorys.

It is therefore

helpful to look to the authorities on the equitable remedies to
distinguish between the two.
George L. Clark, in his Treatise, EQUITY, Bobbs-Merrill
Company, Inc., 1954, at p. 370, stated:
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If, on account of a mistake common to both
parties to a bilateral transaction the written
instrument does not express the true agreement
of the parties, equity will generally correct
the instrument so as to conform to the actual
bargain. Perhaps the most common instance is
that of a conveyance which, beceiuse of a
mistake of the scrivener not discovered by
either party, describes too much or too little
property, * * * .
At page 408 of that Treatise, in a section entitled "Rescission
Distinguished From Reformation", Clark further stated,
The main distinction between reformation and
rescission, as has already been pointed out,
is that reformation is an affirmance of the
bargain as it was actually made,
while
rescission is a disaffirmance of the bargain
itself.
In order that reformation may be
given there must have been a previous
agreement which the court may use as a
standard for the correction of the erroneous
instrument; in order that there be rescission
such p r e v i o u s
agreement
is not
only
unnecessary but its existence would ordinarily
prevent rescission. [Emphasis added]
See also Re, Edward D. , Cases and Materials on REMEDIES, The
Foundation

Press,

Inc.,

1982,

p.

478,

quoting

Hermann,

"Reformation and Rescission," 1960 U. 111. L.F.I, 44 (1960):
The basic distinction between reformation and
rescission is "clear and well defined; the
reformation of a contract involves an effort
to enforce as reformed, whereas rescission
involves an effort to abandon and recede from
a contract which the other party had not
intended to make."
As was demonstrated

in point I,

above,

there was a

meeting of minds as to what was to be conveyed to the Grahns by
the Defendant Trusts.

Grahns submit that the purpose of the
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remedy known as reformation is to provide relief in circumstances
such as theirs.
remedy.

The law in Utah clearly

allows

for such a

Justice Zimmerman, of the Utah Supreme Court, in the

case of Briggs v. Liddell, 699 P. 2d 770 (Utah 1985), at page 772,
said:
A contract may be reformed for either of two
reasons.
First, if the instrument does not
embody the intentions of both parties to the
contract, a mutual mistake has occurred, and
reformation is appropriate.
Second, if one
party is laboring under a mistake about a
contract term and that mistake either has been
induced by the other party or is known by and
conceded to by the other party, then the
inequitable nature of the other party's
conduct will have the same operable effect as
a mistake, and reformation is permissible.
(Citation omitted)
Both reasons apply to the instant case.

See also Naisbett v.

Hodges, 307 P.2d 620 (Utah 1957), Peterson v. Eldredge, 246 P.2d
886 (Utah 1952), and Hottinger v. Jensen, 684 P.2d 1271 (Utah
1984) .
In Hottinger v.

Jensen,

Ibid.,

at 1273,

the court

examined circumstances very similar to those before this Court
and determined

that reformation was appropriate.

The

court

stated:
This case is a clear case of mutual mistake by
the parties. The defendant and all subsequent
purchasers except plaintiffs agreed that the
understanding and the intent of the parties to
the various deeds was that the fence line be
the boundary.
It was only due to a mistake
made by the drafter of the deed as to the
metes and bounds description that the deed did
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not conform to the intent of the parties.
Reformation is clearly appropriate where there
is a variance between the written deed and the
true agreement of the parties caused by a
draftsman.
Based upon the foregoing, reformation is clearly an appropriate
remedy under the circumstances.

(Although not raised by Gregorys

in their brief, the Bradshaws have claimed that they were bona
fide

purchasers

of

Parcel

Two

Plaintiffs' claim of reformation.

and,

by

that

fact,

blocked

Hottinger also ciddresses this

standard, and applies directly to the facts in this matter, to
establish

that

Bradshaws

were

not

Reformation was, therefore, avciilable.
Had there been no mistake

bona

fide

purchasers.

See page 1273.)
in the legal

description

which was used by Grahns and Gregory, performance, as agreed,
would have been complete.

If, under those circumstances, the

Gregorys had refused to perform at closing, Grahns would have
been entitled to relief in the form of specific performance of
the agreement set forth in the Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to
Purchase Agreement.

(Exhibit. "1-P")

Gregory would have been

bound by the agreement to sell the land, including the Private
Drive, to the Grahns, without regard to the suggested negative
effect upon them.

The Grahns would be entitled to

specific

performance because the agreement had been made, the intent was
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clear, and the Grahns would have had no adequate remedy at law.
It is submitted that the remedies of specific performance and
reformation are strongly related.
It is clear from the testimony of all witnesses with
knowledge of prior events (and especially from the Earnest Money
Agreement with typed Addendum

in which the Private

Drive

is

specifically referred to as the boundary) that Gregory intended
to sell to the Grahns the estate identified as Parcel One and
that that estate would include the Private Drive.
description

which

was mistakenly

used

Only the legal

has drawn

question

to

whether that intent was fulfilled.
The Trial Court should be upheld in its ruling that the
deed be reformed to provide that the Private Drive be included in
Parcel One.
Ill
THE REMEDY OP RESCISSION OF THE SALE OP PARCEL ONE
TO THE GRAHNS IS NOT APPROPRIATE.
(Response to arguments I and III
submitted by Gregory in Appellant's Brief.)
A.

The Defendant Trusts did not elect rescission, act

promptly and unequivocally announce their intention to rescind;
but

instead

ratified

the transaction,

and

cannot

now

claim

otherwise.
A prerequisite to a claim for rescission is that the
party seeking rescission must elect to rescind, must act promptly
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in doing so after discovery of the reason for its claim that it
is entitled to rescission, and must unequivocally announce that
intention.

See Perry v. Woodall, 438 P.2d 813, 815 (Utah 1968).
The Gregorys waited forty-one (41) days, from October

11, 1986, to November 21, 1986, to advise the Plaintiffs of the
mistake.
did

not

The letter which was delivered to them (Exhibit
constitute

rescission.

a

tender

of

rescission

or

f,

8-Pf!)

election

of

It did offer rescission as one alternative solution.

The letter, further, was not unequivocal in its announcement.

On

receipt, the Grahns sought, but were not allowed an opportunity
to analyze the situation.

Instead they were pressed to decide,

even before the next business day.

(Transcript:

Mrs. Grahn,

pages 76-79.)
Further, nothing in the letter from Gregory or in the
evidence before the Court indicated an ability of the Defendant
Trusts to repay the Plaintiffs.

Nothing in the notice or in the

testimony would indicate how Gregory would have proposed (or now
proposes) to place the Grahns in the status quo immediately prior
to the purchase of the property.

(See argument in Section III.

B.4., below.)
Finally, even if Gregory had a right to rescission, any
such

right

estoppel.
were

was waived

and/or

is barred

by

the principle

of

Due to the Gregorys' actions, the Defendant Trusts

barred

from

seeking

such
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equitable

relief.

The

uncontroverted evidence before the Trial Court was that five (5)
to six (6) days after the mistake was discovered, and a few days
after Defendant McNeil had explained the effect of this mistake
to

Defendants

Bradshaw

and

Trusts,

in

response

to

direct

questions by Mrs. Grahn concerning the meaning of survey markings
on their property,

Gregory concealed the facts and affirmatively

volunteered

to Mrs.

Grahn that the Grahns

driveway."

(Transcript:

"still

owned

the

Testimony of Mrs. Grahn, pages 70-72.)

Having made that misrepresentation

and effectively

duped

the

Grahns into believing that no further inquiry was necessary, the
Gregorys then waited another thirty-five (35) days to advise the
Grahns to the contrary.

During that period of time, Gregorys

dealt with Salt Lake County Planning and Zoning
disclose the new facts to them, either).
close the sale to the Bradshaws —

(but did not

They then arranged to

but only by quit claim deed as

to the Private Drive (Exhibit 13-P, page 2, numbered paragraph 2)
and with an agreement effectively allowing for rescission should
they be unable to deliver the land under and across the Private
Drive to Bradshaws.

(Transcript: Mrs. Gregory, pages 178-179;

Exhibit "13-P".)
Considering

such

behavior,

Williston

on

Contracts,

Third Edition, Volume 13, 1970, § 1557, p. 98-9, states:
However, the courts are in substantial accord
that any rights the injured party may have by
way of disavowal, disaffirmance or rescission
must be asserted and exercised in a timely
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manner or they will be deemed waived or lost.
For this purpose, mistake is often assimilated
to fraud:
"Where a party desires to rescind upon the
grounds of mistcike or fraud, he must, upon the
discovery of the facts, at once announce his
purpose, and adhere to it.
If he be silent
and continue to treat the property as his own,
he will be held to have waived the objection
and will be conclusively bound by the
contract, as if the mistake or fraud had not
occurred.
He is not permitted to play fast
and loose. Delay and vacillation are fatal to
the right which had before subsisted."
[Citation omitted]
And where after a mistake is discovered, a
party continues to carry out his part of the
bargain without notifying the other party of
any intent to rescind or disaffirm the
agreement within a reasonable time, it will be
deemed a subsisting and binding obligation. *
* *

In conclusion, it is noteworthy, as the courts
have frequently pointed out, that the
intention to disaffirm the agreement, or, for
that matter to waive the right to terminate,
or rescind, may be manifested not only by
verbal expressions, written or oral, but by
conduct as well. (Citations omitted.)
Similarly, Clark, in his Treatise, EQUITY, supra, at
page 424, succinctly states:
If the plaintiff after learning of the mistake
has expressly or by his conduct ratified the
transaction, it is then too late to ask for
rescission.
B.

Defendant

Trusts

did not

satisfy

the

elements

which must be established in order to obtain equitable relief of
rescission due to a unilateral mistake.
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As noted by the Gregorys in their Appellant's Brief,
the

standard

in

Utah

in

regard

to

rescission

based

upon

a

unilateral mistake has been referred to in Briggs v. Liddell, 699
P. 2d 770 (Utah 1985) wherein, at page 773, the court stated:
* * * Under proper circumstances, rescission
is available as a remedy for a unilateral
mistake of fact.
We have outlined the
following [elements that must be established
in order to obtain such relief]:
(1) The mistake must be of so grave
a consequence that to enforce the contract as
actually made would be unconscionable.
(2) The matter as to which the
mistake was made must relate to a material
feature of the contract.
(3) Generally the mistake must have
occurred notwithstanding the exercise of
ordinary diligence by the party making the
mistake.
(4) It must be possible to give
relief by way of rescission without serious
prejudice to the other party except the loss
of his bargain.
In other words it must be
possible to put him in statu quo.
[Emphasis supplied.

Citations omitted.]

At trial, the Gregorys

failed to carry their burden to establish those points.
one

of

the

elements

inappropriate.

is

not

satisfied,

Grahns submit that,

rescission

based upon the

If any

would

be

evidence

adduced at trial, the Trial Court correctly refused to grant
rescission.

None of the elements was satisfied.
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In Del Porto v. Nicolo, 495 P.2d 811, 812 (Utah 1972),
the Utah Supreme Court acknowledged a party's assertion that the
court may review the evidence and determine facts, and stated:
* * * However, in the practical application of
that rule it is well established in our
decisional law that due to the advantaged
position of the Trial Court,
in close
proximity to the parties and the witnesses,
there is indulged a presumption of correctness
of his findings and judgment, with the burden
upon the appellcint to show they were in error;
and where the evidence is in conflict, we do
not upset his findings merely because we may
have reviewed the matter differently, but do
so only if evidence clearly preponderates
against them. (Citations omitted.)
1.

Element

(1): The

mistake

must

be

of

so

grave

a

consequence that to enforce the contract as actually made would
be unconscionable.
As demonstrated in point I, above, Gregory failed to
establish that the consequence of the failure to leave a full
half (1/2) acre on the other side of the Private Drive would be
unconscionable.

The remaining lot (Parcel Two) is not useless.

As also demonstrated above, the Gregorys concluded that the lot
could not be built upon because it was slightly less in size than
the minimum required lot in that zone, and because the Bradshaws
could

not

fit

their

"dream 11

house

on

the

property.

Knowledgeable, impartial and expert testimony, however, differed.
Warren Reynolds, Senior Planner in charge of subdivisions, at
Salt Lake County, testified as follows:
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Q.
[by Mr. Adams] In the event that this
parcel which we refer to in the trial as
Parcel No. 2 -- that is what was represented
as approximately .56 acres.
If that turned
out to be less than half an acre, would it be
appropriate to file for a variance from the
straight application of the lot requirements?
A.
Yes.
This would require a variance by
the Board of Adjustment, because the zone
requires half-acre lots, and that's what we
worked towards and approved as the Eccles
non-reg subdivision.
Q.
Has any such variance been filed, to your
knowledge?
A.
(Transcript:

Not to my knowledge.

page 251,

lines 24-25,

page 252, lines 1-11.)

Later, under cross-examination, having been asked questions by
Mr. Woodbury concerning whether Parcel Two was buildable, Mr.
Reynolds answered:
A.
The P l a n n i n g C o m m i s s i o n w a s v e r y
concerned with the building of this —
of
putting a building on this lot because it has
a slope of nearly seventy (70%) percent, and
there was real concern. That's why it took a
lot of time to be assured that there was a
buildable site on this proposed lot and that
it would be something that would be — meet
the health, safety and welfare which we are
charged to do.
Q.

So, this was a very, very steep lot?

A.

Very steep.

Q.
Very steep. Now if this lot were to be
narrowed significantly, lets say take twenty
(20) feet minimally off the property, would
that increase your concern with respect to the
buildability of that lot?
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A.
You pointed to the west boundary, to that
twenty (20) feet off that boundary.
Probably
not.
(Transcript:

page 264, lines 4-18.)

Mr. McNeil, a professional engineer and surveyor with
years

of

experience

(Transcript:

pages

220-221)

answered

questions concerning Parcel Two, with a boundary along the south
and east side of the existing driveway,
revised survey

(Exhibit

,f

12-P!!) .

as indicated

in the

Although the easement granted

by Gregory to Grahns was a fifteen (15) foot easement, Mr. Walker
asked Mr. McNeil:
Q.
In your opinion, let me ask you, if you
had a 2 5-foot ecisement, what could you do with
that remaining piece? Could you build on it,
in your opinion, as a surveyor?
A.
I think you
southeast corner.

could

build

up

in

that

Q.
Are you familiar w i t h the zoning
requirements for the county for building in
this, on this piece of property?
A.
(Transcript:
Mr.

Walker

I'm familicir with that.

page

241,

continued

lines

his

17-25,

page

cross-examination

242,
to

line

1) .

establish

hypothetical setbacks according to a hypothetical variance and
continued

to

assume

a

25-foot

easement.

Even

under

those

circumstances, and mindful of the topography of the hill on the
lot, Mr. McNeil testified that it would be feasible to build on
that site.

(Transcript:

pages 242-243)
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It is respectfully submitted that the Trial Court could
reasonably conclude, based upon this evidence, that Parcel Two
was usable even after reformation.

A variance could be sought,

and, it is submitted, would certainly be favorably considered
where the size of the property

is so close to that which is

technically required by zone for development.
contrary

was

submitted.

The Defendants

No evidence to the

did

not place

into

evidence either testimony or other proof of an application for a
variance or denial.
Finally, the property, for years, had been part of the
main

parcel.

There

was

no

evidence

before

the

Court

that

continued use as part of another, adjoining parcel, was out of
the

question.

The Justices

of

this

Court

are

respectfully

reminded that the Trial Judge made a formal visit to the property
to view it.

It is submitted that he would have seen an area of

large estates on a uniquely wooded, aesthetically pleasing, but
uneven terrain.

A visitor could easily have determined that use

as a building site or undeveloped ground was a use which may be
attractive to others, nonetheless.

It would therefore not be

unconscionable to enforce the parties 7 agreement, even if the
measured quantity of land in Parcel 2 was slightly below one-half
acre.
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Treatment of the issue of unconscionability necessarily
includes

an

analysis

of

the* circumstances

under

which

the

mistake, as to the amount of land left over, was made.
"Absent fraud, duress, mistake or the like
attributable to the grantee, a competent
grantor will not be permitted to attack or
impeach his own deed.11 (Citation omitted)
Barlow Soc v. Commercial Security Bank, 723 P.2d 393 (Utah 1986),
at 4 01.

The Utah Supreme Court has also noted:
* * * that the parties to a real estate
transaction do not deal on equal terms.
An
owner is presumed to know the boundaries of
his own land, the quantity of his acreage, and
the amount of water available. If he does not
know the correct information, he must find out
or refrain from making representations to
unsuspecting strangers.
"Even honesty in
making a mistake is no defense as it is
incumbent upon the vendor to know the facts."
(Citations omitted)

Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1980), at 1246.

Although the

Gregorys may have honestly made a mistake in regard to the effect
of the survey upon them,
allowed

to

use

that

in equity,

mistake

to

they should

claim

that

the

not now be
effect

was

unconscionable.
See also Williston on Contracts, supra, § 1557, page
2440, wherein the point is stated in this way:
When is rescission available as a remedy?
Where reformation is possible, it is generally
the only remedy permissible, since the mistake
of the parties related to their expression
only, and to decree rescission and freedom
from all obligation would be a clear violation
of their intent.
(Citing) Bollinger v.
Central Pa. Quarry Strip. & Construction
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Company, 425 Pa. 430, 229 A.2d 741; affirming
decree of reformation it was stated: "Once a
person enters into a written agreement he
builds around himself a stone wall, from which
he cannot escape by merely asserting he had
not understood what he was signing. However,
equity would completely fail in its objective
if it refused to break a hole through the wall
when it finds, after proper evidence, that
there was a mistake between the parties, that
it was real and not feigned, actual and not
hypothetical."
(Emphasis supplied: other
citations omitted)
2.

Element (2):

The matter as to which the mistake

was made must relate to a material feature of the contract.
Gregory also failed to establish and meet his burden of
proof with

respect

to the

second

element.

The contract

question is that between the Grahns and Gregory.

in

There is no

evidence that the Grahns and Gregorys concerned themselves, as
between them, with the size of Parcel 2.
testified that they were not concerned
land in Parcel 1.
the

transcript.)

uncontradicted.

In fact, the Grahns
about the quantity of

(See Statement of Facts 5.d., and citations to
The

testimony

in

those

regards

was

Therefore, the only evidentiary basis upon which

the Trial Court could consider materiality would have been the
testimony

of the

Gregorys

that

the

size

of

Parcel

material feature in their own division of the parcels.

2 was

a

They made

a mistake in making that division.
In the sale of Parcel 1 to the Grahns, the agreement to
buy

and

sell

was

clear

and,
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but

for

the

mistaken

legal

description, was documented by the parties.

The Gregorys did

not intend, in making that sale, to reserve a certain quantity of
land.

They did not negotiate with the Grahns in regard to how

the land would be divided.

Rather, they presented certain land

to the Grahns with certain visually identifiable boundaries, and
intended to convey that land to the Grahns.
Grahns

respectfully

submit

that,

to

rule

otherwise

would establish a precedent which might allow parties to avoid
their own contracts where they can later claim, and emotionally
argue, that the contract in question should be avoided because
they

made

contract.

a

"mistake"

in

their

Corbin on Contracts

decision

to

enter

into

the

(1952 edition) § 608, page 560

addresses the issue more clearly:
It must be borne in mind, however, that the
circumstances accompanying the mistake must
always be considered,
just as they were
considered by the former courts of Chancery.
It has never been asserted, and it is not
being asserted here, that a party ever makes
out a sufficient case for relief, either
affirmative or defensive, by merely proving
that he was caused to execute a deed or to
make a promise by the fact that he had a
mistaken thought. * * * Here are two of the
more important factors: Did the other party
participate either intentionally or innocently
in causing the mistake? Is it still possible
to restore the other party to his original
position? (Citations omitted)
In the Defendant Trusts 7 Brief on page 40, they cite
California law to support their claim that they need not have
articulated their mistake.

Schultz v. County of Contra Costa,
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203 Cal Rptr. 760, 765 (Cal. App. First Dist. 1984).

There, a

buyer purchased a lot from the government at a tax sale for the
purpose of building a house on it.

He looked at the lot, the

surrounding developed lots, and the plat.

He inquired regarding

the lot with the government officials and others, but was not
told that it was not large enough to build on.

The government's

tax assessment valuation was consistent with

a small building

lot.

After the purchase, the tax valuation was reduced to less

than one quarter of that value because the lot could not be used.
Considering rescission, the split court affirmed the ruling of
the court below, implying in its statements that the government
should have known what the buyer would be thinking.

There, the

government may have innocently led Schultz to his mistake.
belief thus formed was

The

clearly material to the buyer's offer to

pay that price.
The case at bar is to be distinguished from Schultz.
The unarticulated,

erroneous belief

of the Gregorys was

not

material to their agreement with the Grahns.
3.

Element

(3):

Generally, the mistake must have

occurred notwithstanding the exercise of ordinary diligence by
the party making the mistake.
Gregory argues, at page 4 0 of Appellant's Brief, that
he exercised ordinary diligence regarding the subdivision of the
property.

Gregory attempts to switch mistakes for the purpose of
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making this argument.

It is not at all clear that

Gregory

exercised ordinary diligence in connection with the unilateral
mistake.
Diligence involves active, vigilant care.

Plaintiffs

submit that a diligent party in the position of Gregory would
have

taken

description

different
was

action

once

discovered.

the

mistake

Gregory

did

the

legal

advise

Grahns

(before the sale to Bradshaws some forty days later)

of the

mistake or its effect on the Trust's plans.

not

in

Gregory did not open

a dialogue in hopes that a solution could be worked out.
The evidence adduced at trial demonstrated,

instead,

that Gregorys refused to accept the suggestion of Mr. McNeil to
reform the descriptions to accomplish the initial purpose: to
place a half-acre
Private Drive.

parcel

on the south and

side of

the

This was true despite the fact that Mr. McNeil

demonstrated that it could be done.
8.c.)

east

(See Statement of Facts

Knowing that it would complicate the problem (see Exhibit

13-P) Gregory secretively closed his sale to Bradshaws, and then
suggested

to

Grahns

that

the

die

was

cast,

unattractive alternatives could be considered.

and

only

two

(See Statement of

Facts 9, 10, and 11.)
The evidence adduced
obtain a variance.

at trial

showed

no attempt

to

No expert opinion was offered in regard to

the claim of Gregory that the lot could not be built upon.
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No

evidence was introduced to indicate that Gregory had made an
attempt to sell the lot to any party other than Bradshaws (who
clearly had plans which did not work with Parcel 2) .

It is

submitted that these sorts of activity would have demonstrated
ordinary diligence.
4,

Gregory was not diligent.

Element (4): It must be possible to give relief by

way of rescission without serious prejudice to the other party
except the loss of his bargain.

In other words it must be

possible to put him in statu quo.
No evidence was
proposition

that Grahns

introduced

at trial to support the

could be placed

in status quo.

In

Appellant's Brief, Gregory argues, simply, that damages could be
awarded to the Grahns.
However, the evidence at trial indicated that Grahns
had sold their prior home (Transcript: Mrs. Grahn, page 116-117);
had

put

at

least

Ten

Thousand

improvements into the property

($10,000.00)

Dollars

of

(Transcript: Testimony of Mrs.

Grahn, pages 65-66, lines 24-25, 1-3); and, most importantly, had
put over one thousand six hundred hours of their time into the
property,

making

it

livable

and,

essentially,

(Transcript: Mrs. Grahn, page 65, lines 5-23).

their

own

The money was

spent on parts and materials which were used by the Grahns,
primarily, in fixing the property.

The Grahns had essentially

invested themselves, time, heart and soul, into this unique real
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estate and the improvements thereon.

From this evidence, the

Trial Court could easily have concluded, and probably did, that
the

Grahns

would

be

seriously

granted to defendant Trusts.

prejudiced

if rescission

were

On the evidence before it, it is

unimaginable that the Trial Court could have concluded otherwise.
As

to

each

of

the

four

elements,

therefore,

defendant Trusts failed to carry their burden of proof.
one of the elements was not proven,
appropriate
contracts.

under

the

standard

the

If only

rescission would not be

applicable

to

unilateral

The Trial Court properly refused to order rescission.
C.

The elements of rescission upon a mutual mistake

were not established at trial.
In Appellant's Brief, defendant Trusts push, twist and
turn their version of the facts in an attempt to make it fit the
law of rescission, in the same manner that the Ugly Sisters, in
the story of Cinderella, attempted to fit their feet into the
glass slipper.

The result is a confusing, frustrating argument

when read by one who is familiar with the true facts.
The true facts, as adduced at trial have therefore been
very carefully identified and documented in this Brief.

Further,

the fact that two separate mistakes were made has carefully been
revealed, and documented.
In

Point

I

of

the

Argument

of

Appellant's

Brief,

Gregory argues, in essence, that a mutual mistake was made by he
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and the Grahns as to a basic assumption.

That mutual mistake,

Gregory alleges, was that Grahns intended to purchase 1.11 acres,
apparently without regard to boundaries; and the parties intended
that Parcel 2 would have .56 acres within it.
22 of Appellant's Brief.)

(See pages 20 and

Yet, as the argument unfolds, Gregory

was unable to establish that there was any evidence of that
factual theory.
Clearly, the trial judge did not find a mutual mistake
such as that argued by defendant Trusts.

This court is bound to

presume the correctness of his findings and judgment.

It is

Gregory's burden to show that those findings and judgment were in
error.

Those findings and judgment cannot be upset unless the

evidence clearly preponderates against them.

See Del Porto v.

Nicolo, supra; which was reaffirmed in Kiahtipes v. Mills, 649
P.2d 9, 11 (Utah 1982) - a case cited by Gregory on page 19 of
Appellant's Brief, but which has no relation to the point for
which it is used as authority.
As demonstrated in Statement of Facts 5.d., above, and
in foregoing argument, there is no evidence that the size of
Parcel 1 was an issue between Grahns and Gregory.

In fact, the

evidence is that the Grahns did not care about the quantified
size, only the boundaries.

Further, it was clear that the Grahns
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did

not

participate

in

the

survey,

representations made to them, and which

but

instead

believed

in turn, formed a basis

for the meeting of the minds between Grahns and Gregory.
Defendant Gregory goes so far as to submit, on page 2 2
of Appellant's
Gregory

was

description.

to

Brief,

that the agreement between Grahns

transfer

Parcel

1,

according

to

its

and

legal

(Incidentally, the record indicated that it was not

clear as to what land was described in that legal description,
even to a surveyor.

Transcript, Testimony of McNeil, pages 4 58,

lines 8-20; 478, lines 19-25).,

It is then argued in that Brief

that Gregory intended to transfer the parcel as described.

[It

is hereby submitted on behalf of Grahns that if this Gregory
allegation

was

true,

it

would,

when

combined

with

the

representations clearly established at trial (Statement of Facts,
4.) demonstrate that the Defendant Trusts, through their Trustee
representatives, defrauded Grahns.]

However, in the very next

sentence, Gregory's argument twists, again, toward an attempt to
describe a mutual mistake.

Again, it is not supported by any

evidence which was adduced before the court.
Clearly, the defendant Trusts failed to establish, with
evidence at trial, the elements of rescission based upon a mutual
mistake.

There was no mutual mistake of the sort argued by

Gregory as to a basic assumption upon which the contract was
made.

Rather, as demonstrated above, in Respondent's
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Argument

II, the parties came to a meeting of minds as to their exchange
of performances, but did not accomplish that performance as they
expected, due to a mistaken legal description.
The cases cited by Defendant Trusts in an attempt to
establish the standard
establish

that

Utah

(page 19 of Appellant's Brief) failed to
courts

have

adopted

that

further, have no relation to the case at bar.

standard

and,

In fact, two of

the cases cited (Kiahtipes and Tanner) do not even allude to the
alleged standard.
On pages 30 through 35 of Appellant's Brief, a detailed
analysis of each of the claimed elements is presented.
sake of argument,

For the

and without admitting that the standard

is

applicable, the following additional responses are offered by
Grahns.
I.

Basic Assumption.

As indicated above, Gregory's

argument is that the sizes of the parcels were basic assumptions
of the contract between Grahns and Gregory.

As has already been

clearly argued and documented, there is no evidence to support
that conclusion.

So, instead, Gregory's argument suggests the

possibility that Grahns anticipated that another person could buy
the

adjacent

lot,

and

then

attempts to turn that

suggested

anticipation, of something which may happen in the future, into a
"basic assumption".

(See page 30, Appellant's Brief).
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Gregory's argument even attempts to convince this Court
that the portion of Parcel 2 which is contiguous with Parcel 1 is
more level than the other portions of Parcel 2.
not true.

This is simply

(See Exhibit 1-P; Transcript: N. Taylor, page 9,

lines 5-8; Reynolds, page 264, lines 4-12.)
Gregory alleges that Illustration 2, from RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)

OF

CONTRACTS

instant case".

§152,

"directly

In its simplicity,

interesting similarities.
case at bar,

is

however.

on point with

the

the Illustration has some

It is easily distinguished from the
First,

and foremost,

the Grahns and

Defendant Trusts, through their representatives, discussed and
reached an understanding in regard to the actual boundaries of
the land.
very

Acreage was not an issue among them.

importantly,

the

error

by

the

surveyor

Further, and,
was

not

in

computation of acreage, as it was in the Illustration.
This
Trusts.

is

a

basic

point

of

confusion

for

Defendant

Grahns submit, and the evidence adduced at trial clearly

establishes, that Parcel 1 was always the same size, as defined
by the physical boundaries which were walked by the Grahns and
identified for them.

The surveyor's mistake was in describing

the location of the boundary line.
Even if it was established that the Grahns 7 acceptance
of certain information given to them formed "an assumption", and
that they therefore shared such "assumption" with Gregory, the

56

defendant Trusts are not entitled to avoid the contract.
result would be unconscionable.

Such a

The Restatement of Contracts,

2nd# §152, Comment a, page 386, explains:
The mere fact that both parties are mistaken
with respect to such an assumption does not,
of itself, afford a reason for avoidance of
the contract by the adversely affected party.
Relief is only appropriate in situations where
a mistake of both parties has such a material
effect on the agreed exchange of performances
as to upset the very basis for the contract.
II.
in

Material Effect * * * .

Appellant's

effect.

Brief

(page

32)

The argument of Gregory

does

not

establish

material

It cites no evidence upon which the court could consider

Gregory's plea that this court overturn the judgment of the trial
judge.

The argument can only rely upon the unilateral mistake,

described and dealt with elsewhere in this Brief.
III.

Bearing the Risk * * *.

Even if the Court were

to accept the argument that a mutual mistake was made as to a
basic

assumption

which

had

a material

effect

on

the

exchange of performances between Grahns and Gregory

agreed

in their

agreement to buy and sell Parcel 1, Gregory must lose according
to the standard argued in the Appellant's Brief.

Certainly,

under no stretch of the imagination, could it be said that Grahns
bore the risk of the mutual mistake which Gregory argues was
made.
A

seller

of real

property

to know

the

boundaries of his own land and the quantity of his acreage.

See

57

is presumed

Sorensen v. Adams, 571

P.2d 764 (Idaho 1977).

Also, see Dugan

v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 1246-1247 (Utah 1980), where the Utah
Supreme Court quoted, as authority, that presumption, and stated
further that
* * * A vendee of real property, in the
absence of acts putting him on notice, has no
duty to investigate to determine whether the
vendor has misrepresented the area conveyed,
(Citations omitted)
That the seller often takes the risk is acknowledged in Comment
a. of the said Restatement, page 403.

It is submitted, further

that the parties supplemented the law by their contract, in that
they

assigned

implication.

the

risk

of

such

a mistake

to

Gregory,

by

(See Exhibit 2-P, "Exhibit A11 of that agreement,

paragraphs A and D.)
Therefore,

it must

be

concluded

that

the

factual

elements of the standards argued by Defendants have not been
satisfied,

Further, neither the authorities nor the cases argued

by Gregory in Appellant 7 s Brief support the proposition that a
mutual mistake was made in this case which would entitle Gregory
to relief of rescission.
Each of the cases on rescission is distinguishable on
its facts from the case at bar.

In most cases cited by Gregory,

the parties were demonstrated to not have a meeting of the minds
as to the transaction into which they proposed to enter.
example, two cases involving subdivisions were cited.
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For

(Eiland v.

Powell 65 S.E. 2d 737 (West Virginia 1951) and Chesapeake Homes,
Inc. v. McGrath 240 A.2d 245 (Maryland 1968)).

In each case, a

seller on behalf of a commercial subdivider misrepresented the
boundary of a particular lot.
representation
subdivider
Rather,

in writing.

attempted

to

The parties did not document the
There was

divide

no

evidence

the property

as

that

the

represented.

the subdivider intended to sell a lot according to a

platted subdivision, while the buyer desired to purchase that
which had been orally represented.

The contracts were rescinded

for a failure of the parties to reach a meeting of the minds.
the case at bar,

as has been established

in this Brief,

In
the

evidence showed that the parties both thought that the legal
description described

the boundary which they discussed,

intended that that be the boundary which was described.

and
As

indicated by the authorities cited in Grahns' second argument,
this is the key difference between the remedy of reformation and
the remedy of rescission where a mutual mistake has been made.
Gregory,

in Appellant's Brief,

quotes the court in

Metzler v. Bolen, 137 F. Supp. 457 (North Dakota 1956) out of
context.

The whole point, in context, is helpful:
To justify reformation on the ground of
mistake, the mistake must have been made in
the drawing of the instrument and not in the
making of the contract which it evidences. A
mistake as to the existing situation which
leads either one or both of the parties to
enter into a contract which they would not
have entered into had they been apprised of
the actual
facts,
will not
justify
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reformation. It is not what the parties would
have intended if they had known better, but
what they did intend at the time, informed as
they were.
Metzler v. Bolen, Ibid, page 461.

The court ruled in that case

that there is no mistake in the language of the contract.
The mutual mistake between Grahns and Gregory was in
their assumption that the instrument of conveyance, the deed,
contained a legal description which fulfilled their expectation
as to the land it described.

Defendants' argument in Point I: a)

fails to establish facts to demonstrate that any other mistake
was mutually made; and b) fails to cite legal authority which
supports the proposition, under the factual circumstances.
IV.
DEFENDANT TRUSTS DO NOT ESTABLISH THAT MUTUAL MISTAKE
IS A DEFENSE TO REFORMATION OF THE CONTRACT
(In opposition to Point II, Appellant's Brief)
In their argument in Point II of Appellant's Brief,
defendant Trusts fail to establish their point, either by logic
or evidence.

No attempt will be made to re-argue the principles

concerning mutual mistake and reformation, dealt with previously
in this Brief.

The cases which Gregory cites do not countervail

against the arguments of the Grahns.
In fact, Defendant Trusts misstate the holding in the
Vermont case which they cite, Bourne v. Laioie, 540 A.2d 359
(1987).

They recite that the Vermont court refused reformation.
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Instead, the court remands the case to the Trial Court to hear
additional evidence and to determine whether the parties can be
given the bargain which they made, which was established to the
satisfaction of the court.

If it can, the court ruled, "* * *

then the deed may be reformed to allow Bourne her thirty-acre
reservation."

Bourne, Ibid, at 363.
V.

CONTRACT PROVISIONS ARE

NOT

MERGED

INTO

A

MISTAKEN DEED

(In opposition to Point IV, Appellant's Brief.)
In Point IV of Appellant's Brief, it is argued that,
despite the mistake in the legal description in the deed from
Gregory to Grahns, Grahns cannot seek reformation because of the
general principle that the provisions of the contract are merged
into the deed.
It is elementary that the principle advanced by Gregory
is incorrect.

If it were correct, no case for reformation of a

deed would exist.
(Utah

1979),

In Neeley v. Kelsch, 600 P. 2d 979, at 981

the court acknowledged

this basic principle

as

follows:
Nevertheless, when a deed executes a contract
of sale of land, all provisions of the prior
contract are usually merged into the deed; and
when a party denies merger due to mistake, he
has the burden to show mistake by clear and
convincing evidence. (Emphasis deleted)
It

is

to

be

noted

that,

in

the

context

of

this

argument, Gregory contends that the Trial Court "* * * made a
61

finding of fact that Gregory intended to convey 1.11 acres which
was

exactly

what

they

did."

(Appellant's

Brief,

Gregory does not cite this Court to the record.
did not enter a finding of fact as stated.

Parcel

1.

statement
There

42.)

The Trial Court

Instead, the court

found that Gregory and the Grahns "accepted11,
description

page

passively,

the

as to the amount of land contained
is

important to the parties.

no

finding

that

that

acceptance

in
was

It was used by the court to establish

equitable compensation for Gregory.
Finally, it is noted that the case cited by Defendant
Trusts as support for their proposition Delbrusky v. Isbell, 740
P. 2d 1325 (Utah 1987), is not a case involving a mutual mistake
of fact.
VI.
IN CONSTRUING BOUNDARIES STATED IN DEEDS,
THE INTENTION OF THE PARTIES IS THE CONTROLLING CONSIDERATION
(In opposition to Point V, Appellant's Brief.)
In Appellant's

Brief,

Point V,

Gregory attempts to

argue that the metes and bounds description prevails

despite

references to the intentions of the parties that the south and
east side of the Private Drive serve as a boundary.

Defendant

Trusts attempt, thereby, to avoid the effects of equity.
Their brief cites Neeley, supra.

In that case,

an

action to quiet title to certain real property, two purchasers of
adjoining parcels of land litigated over that which they received
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fails, the court will employ a rule of construction which favors
the grantee.

See Russel v. Geyser-Marion Goldmining Company, 42 3

P.2d 487 (Utah 1967).
It

is

respectfully

submitted

that

the

legal

descriptions and the other evidence before the Court demonstrate
together a sufficiently clear expression of the intent of the
parties to wit: that the driveway was intended to be part of
Parcel 1.
VII.
BRADSHAWS DO NOT ASK FOR REVERSAL OF THE ORDER TO RESCIND
THEIR CONTRACT WITH GREGORY FOR THE PURCHASE OF PARCEL 2,
AND, THEREFORE, HAVE NO PROPERTY INTEREST AND
NO CAUSE OF ACTION FOR RELIEF ON APPEAL.
The

Bradshaws,

in their

Brief,

do

not

appeal

decision of the Trial Court to rescind the agreement
Bradshaws

and

Gregory

for the purchase

of

Parcel

2.

the

between
(See

Judgment and Order dated December 23, 1988, Record, page 543, et
seq.; page 3, paragraph 3.)
Nonetheless,

Bradshaws submit a Brief on Appeal

to

essentially join with Gregory in his appeal from the judgment of
reformation.

They also seek reversal of the judgment of the

Trial Court that their claims against plaintiffs be dismissed for
no cause of action.

(Judgment and Order,

paragraph 4 on page 3.

See also Findings of Fact and Conclusions

of Law in support thereof.

Record, page 530.)
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Rocky Huunt.;..!

Refractories

allegedly

agreed

to

provide

their

insulated

aggregate for the construction of Bradshaws7 house if, in return,
Bradshaws would allow them to use it as a model.
land upon which to build,

Without the

any alleged contract could not be

performed.

Due to the rescission of their contract to purchase

Parcel 2,

Bradshaws had no property and hence had no way to

perform any contract with Rocky Mountain Refractories.

Likewise,

in regard to the argument concerning "wrongful injunction", since
rescission was granted by the Trial Court, the Trial

Court's

injunction was clearly proper to prohibit Bradshaws from building
on ground which they did not own.
The

appeal

of

Bradshaws,

therefore,

is without

a

foundation, and should be dismissed based upon that reason.
It is respectfully submitted that Bradshaws cannot now
argue that they implied or meant to seek reversal of the judgment
of the Trial Court to rescind the purchase of that property.
Bradshaws have cast their lot.

The Plaintiffs brought, in this

matter, a Motion to Dismiss the appeal of Bradshaws consistent
with their good faith tactical decision to avoid opening an issue
in

regard

to

rescission

which

might

Bradshaws in their Reply Brief.
Motion

to

Dismiss was

filed,

then

be

dealt

with

by

At the point in time that the
Plaintiffs' whole

Respondent's

Brief, up to the point of this argument, had been researched,
analyzed,

planned

and written.
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Responsive
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Gregory would be free
agreement for sale of
mistaken assumptions.

to enforce their
Parcel 2 without

And, on page 6 thereof, Bradshaws continued:
The Bradshaws and Gregory have never had
a dispute. * * * Gregory has never voided the
contract with Bradshaws. * * *
The Trial Court did, however.
Since Bradshaws have no property interest in Parcel 2,
the issues of whether they were bona fide purchasers, whe~ther the
injunction was wrongful, or whether their contract with Rocky
Mountain

Refractories

was

valid,

are

no

longer

relevant.

Bradshaws have no standing to seek the relief identified in their
appeal, even if, for the sake of argument, they are right.
VIII.
BRADSHAWS WERE NOT BONA FIDE PURCHASERS
In the case of Hottinger v.

Jensen,

684 P. 2d

1271

(Utah, 1984), at 1273, the Utah Supreme Court acknowledged that
»* * * the right of reformation of a deed can be cut off by
purchase

of the property by a bona

without notice of the mistake.11
bona fide purchasers.
A bona

for value

Bradshaws claim that they were

They clearly were not.

fide purchaser would

without notice of the mistake,
decision.

fide purchaser

have to take the

deed

as indicated in the Hottinger

The facts adduced at trial were that Bradshaws were

well aware of the facts relating to the mistake at the time they
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J dahlia* ,

pag^

.;otice,

Bradshaws attempt
property

before they

to argue

discovered

the

that

they

mistake.

purchased
They

the

claim the

purchase was made when they signed their earnest money agreement.
The case which they cite would appear to resolve their confusion.
In Lach v. Deseret Bank, 746 P.2d 802 (Utah App. 1987), at page
805, it is acknowledged that "[a]n earnest money agreement is a
legally

binding

property."

executory

contract

for

the

(Emphasis added, Citations omitted)

sale

of

real

The closing, in

this case on November 20, 1986, was the time that the purchase
was completed.
have avoided,

Prior to that closing, Bradshaws could: clearly
without any repercussions to them,

performance

under their earnest money agreement.
The Trial Court's decision that Bradshaws were not bona
fide purchasers

is clearly

supported

by

the

evidence.

The

findings and judgment cannot be upset unless the evidence clearly
preponderates them.

See Del Porto v. Nicolo, supra.
IX.

BRADSHAWS DID NOT HAVE AN ENFORCEABLE AGREEMENT
WITH ROCKY MOUNTAIN REFRACTORIES
Bradshaws claim, in their Brief, that they had entered
into an enforceable agreement with Rocky Mountain Refractories,
and

were

deprived

therefore damaged.

of

the

benefits

of

that

agreement,

and

However, the evidence before the Trial Court

was clearly to the contrary, and supported the judgment by the
Trial Court.

That judgment should not now be questioned, unless

it can be demonstrated that the evidence preponderates against
it.

Del Porto v. Nicolo, supra.
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and arguments

ONGPUL

a s to !::>e if:,.

which had been submitted to it, granted on December 19, 1986, a
preliminary

injunction

essentially

restraining

Bradshaw

breaking ground to construct a home on Parcel 2,
Private Drive,
parties.
the

from

and/or the

pending resolution of the dispute between the

It was, in fact, Bradshaws' threat which made necessary

commencement

of this

action,

rather

resolve the dispute by negotiations.

than

an

attempt

to

It is submitted that his

adamant position in that regard has kept the Grahns and~ Gregory
from finding a solution and avoiding significant legal expense.
The order of the Trial Court is found in the Record at
page 87.
The motion and supporting affidavit begin at page 20 of
the Record.

Bradshaw makes no argument in his Brief to support

his supposition that this Court might find the injunction to have
been wrongful.
It has been exhaustively demonstrated

in this Brief

that the evidence supported the decision of the Trial Court at
trial.

That decision logically followed the injunction which was

granted.

The

evidence

injunction

was granted,

in the
was

stipulation,

significantly

Bradshaw, than the facts adduced at trial.
Facts.)

upon

more

which

favorable

the
to

(See Addendum I,

As has been pointed out above, the Trial Court rescinded

the agreement whereby Bradshaw would have purchased Parcel 2.
Bradshaw has not appealed that decision, and cannot now complain.
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ipnp^ I

espect,
I iOll it

No

evidence

was

adduced

before

the Trial

Court

to

indicate that Grahns and Gregorys either negotiated or agreed to
an amount of land to be contained in Parcel 1.
contrary,

In fact, to the

the evidence was that the parties did not

concern

themselves in relation to that agreement with the amount of land
in Parcel 1, but instead to the physical boundaries thereof, as
represented.

(See Statement o,f Fact, 5.d.)

The key, unbiased

testimony in that regard was that of the real estate agent for
Defendant Trusts, Noel Taylor.

He was told by his principals

that he could sell the property as a whole, or in one of two
parcels,

which

were

identified

for

him

by

their

physical

boundaries, especially focusing upon the staked boundary along
the south and east side of the Private Drive.
8, 27, 28, 33 and 34.)
concerning

any

(Transcript: pages

He testified, in response to a question

discussions

which

he

may

have

had

regarding

specific acreage of either parcel by implying the negative and by
focusing upon the Grahns , concern that they purchase the Private
Drive.

(Transcript: pages 7 and

8.)

In

fact,

Mr.

Taylor

testified that it was he who arrived at the recitation of the
size of 1.1 acres, by simple subtraction.
the transcript.)

(Pages 35 and 36 of

He made no reference to any concern

of the parties in regard to that description of acreage.
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of either

The evidence adduced at trial also indicated that the
deduced

acreage,

for Parcel 1,

was incorrect.

Mr.

McNeil

testified that the amount of land contained in the mistaken legal
description was 1.19 acres.

(Transcript: page 460, line 8.)

There was no evidence before the Trial Court that the
quantification of land was actively made a part of the deal or
"accepted" by the parties.

The best the Trial Court could do

based upon the evidence was to draw a conclusion from assumptions
which were not testified to.

Apparently, a person in the Salt

Lake County Recorder's office created a legal description by
deduction, using the legal description for Parcel 2 which had
been drawn by Mr. McNeil.
lines 8-13.)
deduction
acres) ,

that

(Transcript: Mr. Gregory, page 343,

Since that legal description also contained the
1.11

the Trial

acres

must

exist

(1.67

Court may have assumed

implication that the parties accepted it.

acres

minus

that there was

.56
an

That implication, if

reasoned by the Trial Court, was weakened by the fact that the
recitation of the size of the property was not used in the deed
between the parties at closing.

(Transcript: Mr. Gregory, pages

352-353.) There was no testimony that its absence concerned any
of the parties.
The evidence was strong at trial that the physical
boundaries of Parcel 1 were important to Grahns and Gregory.

Mr.

McNeil had been instructed in regard to the boundary between the
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properties;

representations

had

been

made

concerning

the

boundaries between the properties; and the agreement was drawn to
refer to that boundary.
It

is

(Statements of Fact 1, 4 and 5.)

respectfully

submitted,

therefore,

that

the

preponderance of the evidence indicated that the price which the
Grahns agreed to pay to Gregory was for a certain piece of land,
and had no regard to its quantified size.

Judgment was granted

to

the

reform

the

deed

to properly

describe

parties agreed to buy and sell.
size,

land which

The land was always the same

and was familiar to both Grahns and the Gregorys.

quantity,

in

terms

important to them.

of

the

acreage,

contained

therein

was

The
not

It is respectfully submitted that this Court

should make its own evaluation of that evidence, and that this
Court

will

find

that the evidence preponderates

finding by the Trial Court.
corrected,

against

the

The error in the judgment should be

and the reformation adjusted

so that it does not

include an award of compensatory damages to Defendant Trusts.
II
GRAHNS ARE ENTITLED TO REASONABLE ATTORNEYS' FEES
The Trial Court did not award attorneys' fees, but did
award costs to the Plaintiffs against all of the Defendants,
except McNeil.

(Judgment and Order, Record, page 543, et seq. ,

page 3, paragraph 7, thereof.)

Grahns appeal from that order,

and submit that the Trial Court should have ordered Defendant
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Gregory to reimburse them for their attorneys7 fees incurred at
trial, and further for those fees incurred on appeal, due to the
breach of the contract.
The Earnest Money Sales Agreement between Grahns and
Gregory

(Exhibit 2-P), on page 3 of Exhibit A thereof,

made

provision for an option to purchase the lot which became known at
trial

as Parcel

2.

Seller granted

paragraph D of that Exhibit.

the option to Grahns in

In relevant part, the contractual

language provided:
* * * Should Buyer fail to exercise Buyers 7
option under this provision, then Seller shall
have the right to sell the property within
ninety (90) days of the date of the expiration
of S e l l e r s 7 said option on terms and
conditions no more favorable than those
originally offered under this paragraph to
Buyer. Should the offer be amended making the
terms more favorable, or should the said offer
fail and a new offer be received, then the
said amendment or offer shall be, once again,
subject to the terms of this provision. The
terms of this provision shall survive the
closing of the purchase of the property which
is the subject of the main A g r e e m e n t .
(Emphasis added)
A

copy

of

the

Agreement

is

attached

to

this

Brief

in

the

Addendum.
In paragraph N of the form agreement utilized by the
parties, it was also agreed:
* * * Both parties agree that, should either
party default in any of the covenants or
agreements herein contained, the defaulting
party shall pay all costs and expenses,
including a reasonable attorneys 7 fee, which
may arise or accrue from enforcing or
77

terminating this agreement, or in pursuing any
remedy provided hereunder or by applicable
law, whether such remedy is pursued by filing
suit or otherwise.
The uncontroverted evidence before the Trial Court was
that the Grahns were not granted an opportunity to take advantage
of the

amended

terms

of the agreement between

Gregory in regard to the purchase of Parcel 2.
Facts,

Bradshaws

and

(See Statement of

11.a. through d. , and citations to the transcript set

forth therein.)
In particular, Bradshaws did not close their purchase
within the two-week period which was called for under the Earnest
Money Agreement which was offered to the Grahns.

It was this

provision which prevented the Grahns from accepting their option.
(Transcript: Mrs. Grahn, pages 67-68.)

Instead, Bradshaws closed

approximately eighty days later.
Further, Bradshaws and Gregorys discovered new facts in
regard

to

the

hereinabove.

property

description,

Grahns were not

Gregory, in bad faith.

dealt

informed,

with

in

detail

but were misled

by

(Transcript: Mrs. Grahn, pages 70-72.)

That discovery led to the amended agreement that the Bradshaw
purchase

would

be

voided

if

the

property

(including

land

belonging to Grahns) could not be delivered. These events led in
turn to the commencement of this lawsuit.
this agreement

(Exhibit

Grahns submit that

13-P) also constituted

amendment to the agreement to purchase.
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a

significant

It clearly "made the

terms more favorable11.

From the viewpoint of the Grahns, it is

most significant that they could have learned of the mistake by
simply

hearing

about

the

changes

relating

to

the

proposed

purchase, and could have benefitted greatly from a new option.
Grahns could further have purchased Parcel 2 knowing that they
would protect their interest in the Private Drive no matter how
the

problem

concerning

the

legal

description

might

have

ultimately been worked out.
It is submitted, further, that by the failure to again
offer the option to the Grahns after October 11, 1986, Gregory
breached

the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing

which he owed to Grahns under the terms of that option.

In fact,

the bad faith shown by Gregory, when given a direct opportunity
to advise the Grahns, makes this point undeniable.

See Weber

Meadow-View Corp. v. Wilds, 575 P.2d 1053, at 1055, (Utah 1978),
a case concerning an option to purchase real estate, wherein it
is stated:
There is no doubt about the correctness of
[the] contention that one who enters into a
contract must cooperate in good faith to carry
out the intention the parties had in mind when
it was made; and that he should
not be
permitted to engage in any subterfuge or
devious means to prevent the other party from
performing, and then use it as an excuse for
failing to keep his own commitment.
See also Nielson v. Droubav, 652 P.2d 1293 (Utah 1982), at 1297,
where the Court held that the parties to an option agreement owe
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each other a duty to act fairly and in good faith to fulfill
their obligations to each other.

In good faith, Gregory should

have disclosed what he knew, at the very least, and also should
have advised Grahns of the new more favorable terms.

Grahns

could then have sought to protect their rights under the option
before the sale to Bradshaw was closed.

The legal issues would

have been much simpler.
The evidence clearly supported the Complaint o-f Grahns
that the option had been breached.
contrary.

There was no evidence to the

The Trial Court, simply, failed to rule on that cause

of action.

It did, nonetheless, rescind the transaction between

Gregory and Bradshaws, as prayed by Plaintiffs, and placed the
parties in the same position as before the Bradshaw transaction
(except

for the reformation).

The option of Plaintiffs

was

thereby reinstated.
Plaintiffs submit that the Trial Court could not have
so concluded without also concluding that the option agreement
was breached by Gregory.

The breach of that option agreement so

influenced the course of events that this entire lawsuit, and
appeal, resulted.
provides

The contractual provision for attorneys7 fees

that the prevailing

party

should

recover

reasonable

attorneys' fees which may accrue from enforcing the agreement or
in pursuing any remedy provided by applicable law.
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Under the express terms of the contract, Grahns are
entitled to costs (which they were awarded below), as well as a
reasonable attorneys7 fee.
P.2d 427

See Estate of Schmidt v. Downs, 775

(Utah App. 1989), page 431, and Nielson v.

supra, at 1297.

Droubav,

This Court of Appeals, through Judge Bench, has

recently also stated:
We begin our analysis with the premise
that "[p]rovisions in written contracts
providing for payment of attorneys 7 -fees
should ordinarily be honored by the courts.11
(Citations omitted) "Furthermore, contrary to
[the] contention that attorneys 7 fees should
be determined on the basis of an equitable
standard, attorneys 7 fees, when awarded as
allowed by law, are awarded as a matter of
legal right."
(Citation omitted)
"Since the
right is contractual, the court does not
possess the same equitable discretion to deny
attorneys 7 fees that it has when fashioning
equitable remedies, or applying a statute
which allows the discretionary award of such
fees." (Citation omitted)
Cobabe

v.

Crawford,

117 Utah

Adv.

Rep.

26,

at

27,

Case

#8880567-CA, September 20, 1989.
The

Plaintiffs

found

it necessary

to enforce

legal rights as they were agreed to by contract.

their

This entire

action is consistent with and part of their pursuit of their
legal remedies in relation to that agreement.

Evidence of the

fees and the issue were submitted to and accepted by the Trial
Court

in

connection

with

Plaintiffs 7

(Transcript: page 272, lines 3-24.)

case,

by

proffer.

Based upon the evidence, the

Trial Court erred in its failure to rule that the contract was
81

breached, and therefore that attorneys' fees should have been
awarded

to Plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs are now entitled

to that

award.
CONCLUSION
The unique property at Brookburn is a beautiful estate,
abundant with trees, foliage and vegetation, with a lovely old
home nestled next to a stream. The home has historically been
served by a 500 foot long private drive which winds down the hill
under a canopy of trees.
When they entered the picture, Dr. and Mrs. Grahn were
informed about the history of the property and were told that
there were two parcels which made up the main parcel, one or both
of which could be purchased.

The parcels had been separated by

Gregory, the trustee of the trusts which owned the property.

The

separation had been made along the south and east side of the
Private Drive.

Gregory had directed and intended for it to be

that way, and would not have done it any other way.
intended for it to be that way.

The surveyor

Survey stakes still marked the

surveyor's work.
The Grahns diligently confirmed the boundaries of the
larger parcel with the home on it with those who spoke on behalf
of the Defendant Trusts.

Those people, Noel Taylor, Mrs. Gregory

and Mr. Gregory, all made especially clear that boundary between
the parcels.

It was even specifically identified in the Earnest
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Money Sales Agreement which was eventually entered into.

The

buyers and the seller had a meeting of minds when their sale was
closed on August 1, 1986,
The description in the deed given to Grahns mistakenly
failed to describe that border line between the parcels.

When

discovered by the Grahns, they promptly brought suit to (among
other things)

reform

the description

to match

the

agreement

between the parties which had been formed and had existed at the
time of closing.

The Trial Court ordered that reformation.

That

order should be affirmed, except to withdraw the compensatory
damages which the Trial Court also ordered be given to Gregory.
There was

no extra

land

given to the Grahns.

Through

the

reformation, they received exactly that which had been bargained
for.

The price need not be reformed.
The Defendant Trusts attempt to persuade this Court on

appeal that the Trial Court's decision should be reversed and
that the purchase by the Grahns should be rescinded.

However,

they are unable to demonstrate that the elements of rescission,
as to either theory which they propound before this Court, are
satisfied,

even by arguing

facts which are not supported

evidence which was adduced at trial.

by

Further, they failed to act

promptly and unequivocally in regard to that intent to rescind,
or to even announce that intention to rescind.

The arguments of

Defendant

before,

Trusts

that

the

description

83

came

and/or

prevails over the intent of the parties are not persuasive.
fact,

those

arguments

demonstrate

the

reason

that

In

equitable

remedies continue to be an important part of modern law.
The

Defendants

Bradshaw,

after

many

visits

to

the

property and long contemplation, offered to purchase Parcel 2 one
month

after the Grahns bought

closing,

Bradshaws

and

Parcel

Gregorys

1.

Well before

discovered

the

their

surveyor's

mistake, and in fact entered into a special agreement which would
allow the purchase by Bradshaws to be voided if Bradshaws could
not have the property which crossed the Private Drive.
were

not

bona

fide

purchasers,

reformation of the deed to Parcel 1.
in

this

case.

They

had

no

and

could

Bradshaws

not

block

They did not suffer damages

agreement

with

Rocky

Refractories, and could not have performed anyway.
Court did not wrongfully

the

issue an injunction,

Mountain
The Trial

but,

in fact,

properly ordered that the purchase of Parcel 2 by Bradshaws be
rescinded.
Dutiful,

good

faith conformance

with

the

agreement

between Dr. and Mrs. Grahn and Mr. Gregory, as trustee, would
have simplified

and resolved

resolution of) this dispute.

(or at least set the stage

for

Gregory owed the Grahns a duty to

advise them of:
a.
The extension of
purchase of Parcel 2;

time

for

closing

on

the

b.
The discovery of the surveyor's mistake and
the resulting problems; and
84

c.
The amendment of the terms of purchase to
include an agreement that the purchase of Parcel 2
would be void if Gregory could not deliver part of
the land which Grahns and Gregory had agreed would
be within the boundaries of Parcel 1.
Gregory thus breached that agreement.

Worse, Gregory even lied

to the Grahns to prevent further inquiry by them before he was
able to sell to the Bradshaws, and thus significantly complicate
the situation.
litigation.

The situation,

as it developed,

led to this

Significant attorneys' fees have been

which should not have been necessary.

incurred,

Due to the breach of the

contract, Grahns are entitled to recover their•attorneys' fees.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

/

day of November,

1989.

Robert/ M. Tayloi
AttornWs for ylaintiffs/Respondents

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the
1989,

a

true

and

correct

copy

of

the

^ d a y

of

foregoing

Mmfa
BRIEF

RESPONDENTS INCLUDING RESPONDENTS' APPEAL was mailed,

OF

postage

prepaid, to the following:
Jeffrey K. Woodbury
WOODBURY, BETTILYON, JENSEN, KESLER & SWINTON
Attorneys for Appellants Gregory
2677 East Parleys Way
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109
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Russell Walker, Esq.
WOODBURY, BETTILYON, JENSEN, KESLER & SWINTON
Attorneys for Appellants
Dean & Christi Bradshaw
265 East 100 South, SuJLtj
Salt Lake City, Utal
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Addendum 1

ADDENDUM I
FACTS

This Addendum

is presented

reference to the correct

factual

to

identify

evidence the

and

cross

misstated,

incomplete, inaccurate or disproved "facts" which were alleged by
Defendants in their brief on appeal.

As indicated

in the

Plaintiffs' Brief, most of the facts alleged by Defendants were
supported only by citations to an early Stipulation which was
submitted to the trial court, prior to discovery or factual
analysis, solely for the purposes of a hearing on a preliminary
injunction.

It was not used at trial.

Most of the factual

information described below was unknown to Plaintiffs at the time
the stipulating was submitted, and was learned in discovery.
If the Justices of this court were to rely on that
Statement of Facts, they would consider a case much different
than that considered by the trial court.
By reference to the paragraphs numbered corresponding
to

those

in

the

Defendants/Appellants,
misstatements,

Statement

of

Facts

submitted

by

Plaintiffs will briefly address those

inaccuracies

or disproven

"facts" which were

alleged in the Appellants' Briefs,
Para. 1, page 5.
first acquired.

Subject:

Size of the property when

Although immaterial, no evidence was submitted to the
trial court in this regard.
Para. 2, page 5.

Subject:

Division of the property in

1961 without subdivision approval; sale of some of the property;
retention of approximately 1.67 acres.
Though also immaterial, these allegations were not
supported by evidence.

Barbara Danielson, a beneficiary of

Defendant Trusts, testified to divisive conveyances in 1960 and
1964.

(Transcript, page 417-418)

There was no testimony in

regard to a sale of the land, nor the size of the land retained.
Concerning the subdivision process, some conflicting testimony
was given by Warren Reynolds, Senior Planner for Salt Lake County
Planning & Zoning.

(See Transcript, pages 250-251)

Para 3, page 5-6.

Subject:

Conveyance to Trustee, in

trust, in 1978.
No evidence was submitted to support this allegation
during trial.
introduced.

Evidence to the contrary of this statement was
Noel Taylor, the broker who listed the property

(Transcript, page 4, line 9) testified that his first listing of
the property

was

entered

into with

therefore, not the Defendant Trusts).

Carolyn

Eccles

(and,

(Transcript, page 19, line

7, et seq.)
Para 5, page 6.

Subject: Construction of the

Drive.

2

Private

Gregory claims that Eccles constructed the Private
Drive to the estate home.

This statement was disproved at trial.

Barbara Danielson testified that the Private Drive was an old
wagon trail, which had existed for approximately 100 years on the
property.

(Transcript, page 423, lines 4-9). No other evidence

was entered in this regard.
Paras 6, 7 & 8, pages 6 & 7.

Subject:

The division of

the property which is the subject of the action into two parcels,
and the instructions to engineer Scott McNeil.
The statements are subtly, but significantly misstated
and inaccurate.
divided

It became clear at trial that the property was

by the Defendant Trusts in 1984 in order to deed, to

Barbara Danielson, a parcel which was intended by them to be
approximately one-half acre in size; and which was to be located
on the south and east side of the private drive, leaving that
private drive to serve the main parcel, upon which the home was
situated.

(Transcript: testimony of Mrs. Gregory, page 156,

lines 4-13; testimony of Barbara Danielson, page 419, lines
11-25; testimony of Mr. McNeil, page 222, lines 7-21; page 228,
lines 14-17; page 229, lines 19-20; page 235, lines 16-22; page
246, lines 8-18; page 475, lines 20-24; page 475, lines 11-18.)
Further, the evidence was that Mr. McNeil wrote a description
only for the parcel to be separated (see above).
parts 1 and 2 of plaintiffs Statement of Facts.

3

Please see

Para 12, page 8.

Subject: Remaining parcel contained

1.11 acres, according to survey.
There was no evidence of an intent on the part of Mr.
McNeil or Gregory to create a parcel of a particular size, 1.11
acres, or otherwise, on the main parcel, on which the private
drive and the home were situated.

No survey was done of the

whole property, as later

became apparent.

became

l.ll

clear

that

the

acre

(See above)

amount

was

It also

obtained

by

subtracting the .56 acre amount from the presumed total of 1.67
acres (the quantity of land which defendant Trusts believed was
in the total parcel prior to division).
of Noel Taylor, pages 35 to 36.)
turned out, were mistaken —
1.19

acres

and

.57

(Transcript, testimony

Even these quantities, it

the mistaken descriptions contained

acres,

for

a total

of

1.76

acres.

(Transcript, testomony of McNeil, page 4 60, lines 5-9.)
Para 14, page 8.

Subject: That Gregory listed parcel 1

and parcel 2 for sale in 1984.
Although a minor point, this was disproven.

It was

shown at trial that the property was first listed by Carolyn
Eccles in March, 1984.

(Transcript, testimony of Noel Taylor,

page 19, line 7, et seq.)

Further, the property was not listed

in parcels, but was listed as one parcel.

(Transcript, testimony

of Noel Taylor, page 26, lines 9-10 and 21-25.)

4

Para 15, page 8-9.

Subject: Grahn inquiries regarding

boundaries and representations regarding "approximate" dividing
line.
Evidence at trial clearly indicated that Grahns heard
and relied upon representations that the Private Drive was part
of Parcel 1, and that the south and east side of that drive was
the dividing line between Parcel 1 and Parcel 2.

They were

advised that Mr. McNeil had been directed, specifically in that
regard, and that he had placed certain stakes, which were shown
to the Grahns, to indicate the property line.

(See citations to

the transcript, above, in section 4 of plaintiffs Statement of
Facts set forth in the Brief, and, especially, the testimony of
Noel Taylor, transcript, page 34; Mrs. Grahn, pages 56 & 57; and
Mrs. Gregory, page 161-162.)
Para 16, page 9.

Subject: Gregory representation to

Grahns regarding boundary line.
Here, defendants allege that Gregory represented that
they had asked McNeil to create a legal description for parcel 2,
and that he had done so designating the boundary as approximately
the southeast edge of the private drive.

Evidence at trial

indicated that specific directions were given to Mr. McNeil in
regard to where the boundary would be, with no suggestion as to
"approximation11.

(See remarks in regard to paragraphs 6, 7 and

5

8, above.)

Mr. McNeil created a legal description for

Parcel 2

after creating Parcel 2 from the directions which were given to
him.

Parcel 2 did not exist prior to that creation.
Para 17, page 9.

Subject: Grahns relied on "those

representations".
There was no evidence adduced at the court regarding
"those" representations, or any such reliance.

The Grahns did

rely on the representations actually made and adduced into
evidence.

See above and statement of Facts of plaintiffs.

See

also, especially, testimony of Noel Taylor (transcript, pages
7-8) .
Para 18, page 9.

Subject: Grahn and Gregory Earnest

Money Sales Agreement.
The best evidence of this agreement is the agreement,
itself.

It is important to note that, in that Earnest Money

Sales Agreement, the parties referred to the boundary between
Parcel 1 and Parcel 2 as being the existing Private Drive.

(See

the Agreement, itself, Exhibit 2-P, and testimony of Josephine
Grahn, page 62.)
Para 2 0,

pages 9 & 10.

Subject: Description of

negotiations.
Gregory alleges as fact that Gregory rejected a request
for a covenant that the property "had been divided in compliance
with law".

This statement was disproved and is therefore

6

misleading.

It was established

contractual covenant concerning

that Gregory

agreed

to a

the lawful division of the

parcels (transcript, testimony of Noel Taylor, page 39, lines
3-7, and subsequent related testimony).

Gregory also alleges

that it had been explained to Grahns that the property seemed to
already be divided according to the legal descriptions of the two
parcels.

Regarding the tax notices, defendant Trusts represented

to Grahns that the parcels had been officially separated, and
Mrs. Gregory advised Mrs. Grahn that the tax notice had the legal
description.

(Transcript: testimony of Josephine Grahn, page 83,

line 9, et seq. .

page 84, lines 3-25; testimony of Harold

Gregory, page 304, lines 2-6.)

There was no evidence that the

legal descriptions had more importance than the representations,
but instead, it was evident Grahns and Gregory believed that the
legal descriptions described that which had been represented.
Para 22, page 10.

Subject: Closing, source of legal

description.
This paragraph inaccurately and misleadingly describes
the facts.

As indicated in connection with the next preceding

paragraph, Josephine Grahn went to the Salt Lake County Recorder
to obtain a copy of a legal description, which Mrs. Gregory
represented she would find.

It was simply more convenient to go

there than to the Gregory's house.

(Transcript, pages 83-84.)

There was no evidence that Mrs. Gregory would have produced a

7

different description.

The County's legal description was

apparently produced by deductive work,
estimate.

including

the size

The Grahns did not know the source of that legal

description, at that time, but in fact believed, based upon the
representation of Gregory, that the survey had produced legal
descriptions of both Parcel 1 and Parcel 2.
82.)

(Transcript, page

The legal description used in the Warranty Deed was

similar, but not exactly the same.

Its source was unknown.

It

did not state or refer to the quantity of land in the parcel.
(Transcript, testimony of HaroLd Gregory, pages 352-353.)
Para 23, page 10.

Subject: Grahns and Gregory "under

impression" that the Private Drive was in parcel 1.
It was established by evidence at trial, that Grahns
and Gregory were far more than under an impression in regard to
the location of the Private Drive, in fact, it was represented
and agreed that the Private Drive was part of Parcel 1.

(See

preceding references to the transcript.)
Para 24, pages 10 & 11.

Subject: Parcel 1 contains

1.11 acre, although it does not contain the private drive.
This allegation was not established by the evidence,
and is argumentative.

It was unclear in the evidence as to

whether the legal description of Parcel 1 could be read to
contain the Private Drive, and also as to the amount of land
contained therein.

(See preceding references to the transcript.)

8

Whether the private drive was part of Parcel 1 was the subject of
the lawsuit.

The trial court found that it was intended,

represented and agreed that it would be.
Para 25, page 11. Subject:

No overlap in descriptions

of the Deeds for Parcels 1 and 2.

'

This statement of fact is misleading in its failure to
acknowledge that the testimony also indicated that there may be
land which is not described by either of the deeds, and would
therefore be a "no man's land11, thus further indicating that a
mistake

was

made

in

the

drafting

of

the

(Transcript, testimony of McNeil, page 465.)

description.

Mr. McNeil also

testified as to the numerous discrepancies, or mistakes set forth
in the legal description which was used in the sale between
Grahns and Gregory.

(Transcript pages 4 67-474.)

that it was clear,

to him, that the legal description was

mistaken in what it conveyed.
Para 31, page 12.

He concluded

(Transcript, page 478.)
Subject: Bradshaw reliance upon

survey.
The evidence in regard to Bradshaws' claimed reliance
upon the survey, although unimportant to the issues, is not clear
from the evidence.

(See transcript: testimony of Noel Taylor,

page 13 & 14, especially lines 6-9 on 14.)
Para 32, pages 12 & 13.

Subject: Telephone conference

between Mrs. Bradshaw and Mrs. Grahn.

9

The statement
application for official

concerns

events leading up to the

subdivision by the County of Parcel 2.

It is incomplete, and misleading in regard to its description of
the conversation.

(See the testimony concerning the telephone

call between Mrs. Grahn and Mrs. Bradshaw: transcript, Mrs.
Grahn, page 69, lines 3-17 and pages 109-110; Mrs. Bradshaw, page
375, lines 1-9.)
Para 36, page 14. Subject: The surveyor's mistake.
This statement concerning the surveyor's mistake is
incomplete and inaccurate.

Mr. Mc!!eil testified that he had made

a mistake in the description, not put the road in the wrong
place.

(See foregoing citations to the transcript; see also

transcript, pages 443-446, page 224, lines 20-21, page 228, lines
14-17.)

Defendants' allegation also states that the Private

Drive is actually within the description of Parcel 2.
the only expert

However,

evidence indicated that a correct reading of the

legal description concerning Parcel 2 would place the boundary on
the southeasterly side of the Private Drive.

(Transcript, pages

464-465.)
Para 39, page 15.

Subject: Revised drctwing, showing

what McNeil "*** believed to be the relationship of the Private
Drive to Parcel 1 and Parcel 2.!f
Significant information is missing, and the statement
is therefore misleading.

As demonstrated

10

in plaintiff's

Statement of Facts, after discovery of the mistakes in his
survey, McNeil first drew a survey reforming the boundaries
consistent with the directions which he had originally been
given.

(Transcript, page 229, lines 19-21; Exhibit 12-P.)

Mr.

McNeil also indicated that there is a one-half acre parcel on the
east side of that Private Drive.
20-25.)

(Transcript, page 475, lines

Further, after presenting his proposal to Gregory and

Bradshaws, he was directed by the defendants to draw the drawing
(not a survey) which became Exhibit 9-P at trial, to attempt to
make actual use of the Deed description and thereby illustrate
«*** the survey description and its relationship to the road."
(Transcript, pages 230-232 quoting, 232, lines 7 & 8.)
Para 41, page 15.
Grahns.

Subject: Gregory failure to inform

Also County postponement of decision.
This statement significantly fails to point out that

the Grahns were, in fact, affirmatively misled in regard to the
existence of the problem.
pages 71-72.)

(Transcript, testimony of Mrs. Grahn,

Also, it should be noted that there is no evidence

in the trial transcript that the County postponed its decision in
regard to subdivision.
grant

of

the

Further, it should be noted that the

subdivision

request was

based

upon

mistaken

information, due to the fact that the County was not informed of
the mistaken survey.

(Transcript, testimony of Warren Reynolds,

page 249, lines 20-22; pages 260-261, and pages 268-269.)

11

Para 42, page 15.

Subject: Bradshaws closed according

to September 1, 1986 Earnest Money Sale Agreement.
The evidence was clearly to the contrary of this
allegation.

The closing between Bradshaws and Gregory was

significantly later than that called for in the Earnest Money
Agreement;

there was

no

contingency

in the Earnest

Money

Agreement for zoning; and no term vas set forth in that agreement
to call for a side agreement to allow the parties to void their
sale if certain property

could not be conveyed.

See the

Agreement, Exhibit P-7, and transcript, testimony of Mary Ethel
Gregory, page 165-166, page 178, ar.d page 210-211.
Para 46, page 16.

Subject: Whether Parcel 2, with a

quantity of land slightly less than half an acre, is rendered
unbuildable.
This

allegation

was

not

established

by

evidence,

although the defendants testified as to their belief that the
lack of quantity made it unbuildable.

In fact, the evidence

indicated that their conclusions were based upon Bradshaw/s
conclusion that he could not build the house that he planned on
that

property

without

using

part

of

the

Private

Drive.

(Transcript, testimony of McNeil, page 230, lines 4 & 5.) Mr.
McNeil testified that Parcel 2 was "buildable" (transcript, page
476), as did Warren Reynolds (transcript, page 252, 264.)

12

From the foregoing, it is clear that the defendants7
Statement of Facts,

especially -- but not only —

relies upon the Stipulation, is unreliable.
not exhaustive.

where it

The foregoing was

Other statements of fact in appellant's Brief

suffer from the same problems.
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Addendum 2

FILEB oianraicr CQIBHT
Th»CI JUUICUAI OMtfiOt

D£££3
Robert M. Taylor, #3208
John S. Adams, #A0017
TAYLOR, ENNENGA, ADAMS & LOWE
Attorneys for Plaintiff
5525 South 900 East, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
Telephone: (801) 263-1112

oy«

.^-ussS^lL;
I M A & W E W <*•:*<

^ ^
3&>dty Clerk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo
ALLEN R. GRAHN and JOSEPHINE
M. GRAHN, husband and wife,

JUDGMENT AND ORDER

Plaintiffs,
vs.
HEROLD GREGORY, Trustee, for
and on behalf of the MARITAL
AND FAMILY TRUSTS OF THE
ALBERT ECCLES FAMILY TRUST,
and DEAN BRADSHAW and CHRISTI
BRADSHAW, his wife, and
SCOTT McNEIL, an individual

Civil No. C-86-8833

Judge:

John A. Rokich

Defendants.
-oooOoooThis matter came on for trial before the Honorable
Judge John A. Rokich on September 24, 1987.

The Plaintiffs were

present, represented by Robert M. Taylor and John S. Adams.
Defendant Herold L. Gregory,

Trustee, and on behalf of the

Marital and Family Trusts of the Albert Eccles Family Trust,
hereinafter referred to as "Trustee" was present, represented by

\,

^^

Jeffrey K.

Woodbury.

Defendants Dean Bradshaw and Christi

Bradshaw, his wife, were present, represented by Russell S.
Walker.

Defendant Scott McNeil was present, represented by his

counsel Allen Sims.
The Court being fully advised in the premises and
having rendered its oral decision and two written Memorandum
decisions and having made and entered its Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, and good cause appearing therefor:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS:
1.

Reformation of the deed delivered by the Defendant

Trustee to Plaintiffs is hereby ordered to include the Private
Road.

Plaintiffs are hereby ordered to pay to Trustee the sum of

Twelve Thousand Six Hundred Four and 04/100 ($12,604.04) Dollars
for the property in Parcel One, after reformation, in excess of
1.11 acres. 1/Interest thereon,
interest, shall commence on

2.

at

> r ^ /-/f&£»

/O

% per annum,
fs/i-ri / £r*/*

e/o

simple
^ucrt,'*

It is hereby ordered that said reformed deed shall

acknowledge that the fifteen foot aesthetic and geologic easement
shall remain as agreed in the surviving provisions of the March
18, 1986 Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase Agreement,
which easement, runs along the southeasterly side of the Private
Road.

2

3.

T h e sales transaction between Defendant

Trustee

a:i id Defendai 1 t: Bradshaw s :i = h e r e b y resci nded and,,, except for the
reformation referred to 1: lereinabove, the parties shal ] be p,3 a :::ed
in the same positi on as before the Bradshaw transaction.
4.
Plaintiffs

T*

'T

i

] that Bradshaws'claims against

are .; , ^missed

entirety

for n o cause o f

action,
5.

J

*

against Defenda r «t McNeil art uisr^Sbcd
6.
Tin i s t e e s

I t - .•

••« i,

.
* ierr i t • - "

'•^ te? i n t
'be

1

separat .

ui

*

s t i p u l a t e d between Defendant
7.

a c i i jn a;

UIUJ

^ and r ^ f e n d a n t y '

as

: .

1

t h e p a r t i e s b u t dues d^diu o u s t s t u

F i f t-i

act, -n

: ] a i i mi =

pursued

the

no cau^e

Ldims

defendants

except

Plaintiffs

against

McNeil

Hundred

I-' i

b e a r t h e i r ow it i c o s t s ai id f e e s .
DATED t h i s

o?«J^ d a y o f (^^^

f **?•$-*y^'

, 11 98 S^T"

B1!: f THE ^™ ' " *n ":

Honfcrable JcYr

*

^okich

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I

hereby

certify

that

on

this

-ZO

dav

of

a true and correct copy of the foregoing
JUDGMENT AND ORDER was mailed, postage prepaid, to the following:
Jeffrey K. Woodbury, Esq.
2 677 East Parleys Way
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109
Allen Sims, Esq.
#8 East Broadway, Suite 510
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Russell S. Walker, Esq.
50 South Main Street, Suite 2000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
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Addendum 3

Fn -

-, '••-OFFICE
v Utah

DEP
\

'' 1988

^

DEPUTE CLERK

IN A N D F O R SALT 'LAKE COUNTY, STATE O F U T A H

A L L E N R # QRAHN and. J O S E P H I N E
M. GRAHN, husband a n d w i f e ,

:

FINDINGS O F FACT A N D
CONCLUSIONS O F L A W

'3 a 2 i I t :. i ffs,

"L'l IL llu. O-Bti Of • I

HEROLD GREGORY, T r u s t e e , for
and on behalf of t h e M A R I T A L
i
A N D FAMILY TRUSTS O F T H E ALBERT
ECCLES FAMILY T R U S T , a n d DEAN
:
BRADSHAW and CHRISTI BRADSHAW
his w i f e , and SCOTT McNEIL.
I
an individual,
Def endar I ts.

:

This n a t t e r came
Roki 'i :: h :: i i September

-

21
. yi-.r

represented by Robert
Herold
Fail! :1 ] i

L. Gregory,
T r i is ; I: ?

:f

t^fore t h e Honcra>

*- J o h n S

T r u s t e e , and c i i behalf
t::l i, = I ] Il : i .3 : t

Ec: .c •] e s

Adams.

Defendant

of t h e Marital and

I c ;ITIII :i ] j

T11 : m 1 5 t:

I: 1 =

referred t o as "trustee 1 1 w a s present, and represented by Jeffrey
II

Woodburi

i i :i f€
Defendant

Defendants Dean Bradshaw and C h r i s t ! Bradshaw., h i s

; i 1= J : • =
Scott

present

McNeil

and represent : :i b} Ill isse] Il S

w a s present,

and i: epresented

W11 kr v

by 111 s

counsel Allen S i m s ,
The

Cox 11: t

he a n I

1.1 M "

L1" 11 1 IIK H ly

Il

1 Iiie^ses,

1 Jim 11 I e d

documentary evidence, viewed t h e property which w a s t h e subject
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matter of this litigation, read the Memoranda on file herein,
heard oral arguments, and then took the matter under advisement
pending
received

the

receipt

the

of

supplemental

supplemental

Memoranda.

Memoranda, reviewed

The

the

Court

file, its

notes, the Memoranda on file and the documentary evidence.
The Court made inquiries from time to time as to the status
of this matter.

The Court was advised that the parties were

attempting to negotiate a settlement.

The Court finally called

plaintiffs1 counsel and requested that this matter be noticed up
for hearing and that their clients be present.

The hearing was

not held because of the illness of one of the attorneys.
Court was

advised

settlement

agreement,

Conclusions of Law.

that the parties
nor

agree

The

could not enter into a

upon

Findings

of

Fact

and

The Court advised counsel it could prepare

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law so that this case can be
concluded at least on the District Court level and the parties
can take whatever action they deem appropriate.
The Court held a hearing on November 10, 1988 for the
purpose of reviewing the status of this case with counsel and
their clients.

The Court explained to counsel and the litigants

that the Court is not the reason for the delay in the resolution
of this case.

The delay is the result of settlement negotiations

and the parties being unable to agree upon the Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law.

Since the parties could not agree, the

r>

*• r\

> • r, -A
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i i ('i i a n

MI

I

|' I ni ini,| i i H | ,

ts

C o n c l u s i o n s c: f I .a w ::I i i accordance with
T h e Court
I

1 1 ! I i n II

ni mi ini I

Memorandum Decision.

mitt^d i t * Findings of !\K t and C o n c l u s i o n s of 1 .aw

I'lll

Ill '' I

Findings c:

, * *

onclusions of Law,

of; the Dbjprtio^*" --»-*

fied m

I I i n I i in

iipli1.

The ,:cur

correctc -

'

*.

notice

• ^ **

I

Law.

The Court now b e i n g fi i] 3 y advised i n t h e p r e m i s e s and havi ng
rendered i ts on a II decisi oi i ai id two \ /r it ten Memorandum Decisions,
now makes the following final Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law.

FINDINGS OF FACT
1

of Sa ]

V

:*.* ': t: " :

'••

•

'"

• » r 6:

c

• =!!!;]| < "I" i I I 111 1

I lil l l l i f J S

ua^u County, State , ,i J tal :i

2

Tl le defendant Marital and Fami ly Trusts of the Albert

Eccles Faroi 1 ;; r Ti: i i s t , Hc= r o] I I
cer t:a :l i 1

:;i : ., .]

proper I:/;

G] :iegor}

] ocated

aI:

T::i :ustee ,
approximate!

B r o o k b u r n Road, Salt Lake City, Sail t I ,ake County, SI
3

Defendants

Dean

Bradshaw

and

Chi: :i sti

:i i n :3 i s :I du a 1 s i e s i d i n j :i i , s • i 11 II: La ke C o n :i 11y
1

T"P S 111 I \ P I I II' «,

Defendant , Scott McNel 1 i s an

Salt Lake County, state of Utah.

> :- U t a h .
'-

S t a t e o f Ut ah.

i ndividual

i ; .siding
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The real property owned by the defendant trusts was

listed for sale.

The real property listed, after negotiation for

the sale and purchase thereof was divided into two parcels.
the

time

of

trial

the

Court

designated

for

At

identification

purposes the two parcels as Parcel One and Parcel Two.
6.

Trustee

represented

to

the

plaintiffs

that

the

southeasterly edge of the road was the boundary between Parcel
One and Parcel Two, and that a 15 foot aesthetic easement along
the southeasterly edge of the private road was to be included if
and when trustee sold Parcel Two.
7.

The private road provided ingress and egress to Parcel

8.

Trustee did engage defendant McNeil to survey a one-

One.

half acre lot on the southeasterly side of the private roadway
for a building lot for Barbara Danielson.

The Court designated

said lot as Parcel Two.
9.

Plaintiffs and trustee entered into an Earnest Money

Receipt and Offer to Purchase Agreement for Parcel One (including
the private road) on March 18, 1986, which transaction was closed
on August 1, 198 6.
10.

Defendants

Bradshaws

and

trustee

entered

into

an

Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase Agreement for the
purchase of Parcel Two.

The legal description used for Parcel

Two had been prepared by defendant McNeil.

GRAt:

•• -r '

i,

i-AGI'", I1"!"1"'1!!1

I-'TIII >1 lir,/-i ," f'.'iNPLURION.S

-xiie Tn^-r-f-'t. M o n e y A g r e e m e n t e n t e r e d

Bradshaws

ar.

. ee

p:i : o v I cf

into by defendants

:l

plaintiffs Grahns had first rig.'

in11

n I aaja,

I li il

refusa. to purchase Parcel

Two.
TO
refusa,

rpri1cr+:oo thereafter offered plaint iJ 1 a a t it: a I i 111 I 11 nl
t*

t urchase

Parcel

descr-

Two which

it I: ::: Parcel

was not exercised by

One w a s o; \ a
n

plaintiffs :- -,!-- *r-n the Salt Lake County Recorders Office
reel
accepted

,

-«

( • •

.,i id d e f e n d a n t s

'

he

due

-J; a;.-

md

acrea^

be

s o l d and purchased*
' ^

southeasterly
technical

edge of the road •

description

1 II

I

I

^.w/iuary ami the

did not conforr

eat mil the

• \JLH^ vjjrtuji, .Jy including the road :i i 1 Parcel One
receive - -1

,

VCPSS

i zrr-^j cf ; in'« p-cutr-

Mone^

:lece:, • ..: . >

they did n^t ;-, i
but
private roadway.

.a,

-

Earnest

.urchas, ^greeme:
survey an describing the boundaries,
.lie southeasterly

side of the
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The defendants Bradshaw did rely upon the reference

made by defendant McNeil that Parcel Two contained .5 acres.
18.

The defendants Bradshaw needed

.5 acres in order to

obtain a building permit from the Salt Lake County Planning
Commission.
19.

If Parcel Two did not contain

.5 acres, defendant

Bradshaws could terminate the agreement and trustee refund the
purchase price.
20.

Prior to defendants Bradshaws closing on the purchase

of Parcel Two, trustee discovered that the McNeil survey was in
error and the remapping of the survey of Parcel Two by defendant
McNeil showed that a portion of the private road was contained in
Parcel Two.
21.

Defendants

Bradshaw

did

not

have

an

enforceable

agreement with Rocky Mountain Refractories.
22.

The

legal

description

contemplated

to be used

for

Parcel Two was in error and did not conform with the intent of
the parties, that Parcel Two has located on the southeasterly
edge of the private road.
23.

Plaintiffs did not rely upon defendant McNeil's survey

of Parcel Two and were owed no duty by defendant McNeil.
24.

The Court makes no finding as to the trustee's claim

against McNeil at this time because counsel for trustee and

GRAHN V
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I In ni

i

i n HI

I HI

i n " if i I i i I I i,

stipulation between those parties.
Based upon the foregoi ng Findings of Fact, the Cour t
enters the fo] 1 owi ng:

iio'w

' '

CONCLUSIONS OF I AW
] ,

reformed

Till: , :

t: :

i=ii

betweei i

i nclude

t:::ii: m is t e e

the private

ai I I

p i a :i it I tiii :!: f s

roadway

si l : "i ill i

as Parcel

11 : =

One ai I il,

plaintiffs shoi il d pay for the excess acreage.
1 1 a i n t i f f s G r a h i i i 11 i :I I: r u s t e e
represents
Ii l t e i r e s t

a

fair

sha] ]

value

of

t h e ground

1: s pa:i I

: ii

tl ic=

••iformed

dee*

s t: i p u 1 a t e 11: I a t $ ] 2 , , 6 0 1 0 1
:i u: i € ixc .ess of

1 1 Ill

$] 2 , 604 . 06 commencing

oi I a

acres.
date

determined ,

agreed

"

. ^, ^ . - ,;.

Money I^ce:»'

tha J "

•*

\

'urchase Agreement, which

casement

*ivate road.
:

.i - iiao*,L U.UM.M.U., ,

therefore r ' entitle*

r

*. ^

/»i .

specifically

*•

^

'* "ore- the agreement for

"'
referre.- < ,

, c ^ t ^ v ., , ,...i £i.-L- .„

c 11asei"iJ 11n I

*
.

position as before the Bradshaw transaction,,

J«.

reformation
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The transaction between trustee and defendants Bradshaw

should be rescinded.
6.

Bradshaws have no cause of action against plaintiffs

for the alleged prevention by injunction of the building of their
home on Parcel Two.
7.

Plaintiffs have no cause of action against defendant

McNeil for the erroneous first survey completed with respect to
Parcel Two.
8.

The defendant trustee's claims against defendant McNeil

may be pursued in separate litigation in a future action as
provided by stipulation between defendant trustee and defendant
McNeil.
9.

The Court does not award attorney's fees to any of the

parties, but does award costs to the plaintiffs against all
defendants except defendant McNeil.

All other parties must bear

their own costs and fees.
Dated this

<~^^

day of December, 1988.

/I

jifl^
,4
ROKICH

JOHN" A.

^RICT COURT JUDGE

ATTto%#'jty

Gteifc
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
ereLv
the

foregoina

CL.rt, ; .

.-.^

Findings

rvl Conclusions of Law, postage
„_-:'_'_

Robert 1 1. Taylor
John S. Adams
Attorneys for Plaintiff
5525 South 900 East, Suite
Salt Lake Ci ty, Utah 84] ?.

-

Tiie and correct copy of

of DoceiTll or

.J

Jeffrey K. Woodbury, Esq.
2677 E . Parley's Way
Salt Lake City, Utah
Allen S i m s , Esq.
#8 E. Broadway, Suite 510
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
R u s s e 11 S . W a 1 k e i: , E s q,
50 S. M a i n , Suite 2 000
Salt Lake City, Utah 841 4 4

i v i &- L ^<

'Il 9 HI I i:

Addendum 4

,.l

• e (• I

EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT-

I I' > { 0 )

—

••>:.,•^Uk'ivT-'.S

- : • " : : - • : •^
^
: ' : * ? / / ! A K t h . i f j : : f ? ^ , • •*. -.^Allen R. Grahn and Josephine^ M/G^
- - r^ -r>; ••*• ••-••<•ft•-^
The undesigned Buyrjr

'•'

_ _ _ _ _ _ _

_». .

1 hereby deposits with Brokerarji

Five hundred and QQ/100
form o«

P e r s o n a l

Check

t O b e d e p o s i t e d

acceptance
>t.„.applicable: submitted by Buyer
'.«rnfjft

'

A

omiars f$5D.Q.-.00

Upon

)

wh.ch shall tierJepos^od m accordance wit^aDpl.caJ^Stntu L;iw

Recoived by

/tl>**« & wCr^ 'rn^yj ^ I /*<*&$-.

Phono Number
OFFER TO PURCHASE

I

PROPERTY DESCRIPTION

1he above stated EARNEST MONEY is given to secure and apply on the purchase of the property situated at

1st Brookburn

. in the City of

2811

S a l t Lake

S a l t Lake

Utah
. County of .
>ec.\ to any restrictive covenants, zoning regulations, utility or other easements or rights of way. government patents or state deeds of record approved by G u y
r.c.oHlnnre with Section G. Said property is more particularly described as: T h e

1 * 1 1 a c r e

p r o p e r t y

aCCOrdinQ

t O tjl_e

?gal d e . s c r i p t i a n ^ j i _ £ h & 3 ^
CHECK APPLICABLE BOXES"

'

3 UNIMPROVED REAL PROPERTY

0 Vacant Lot Q Vacant Acreage

Q Other

X IMPROVED RFAL PROPERTY

Q Commercial

§ Condo

I, 1 1 in c I u d e cl i 1. e ms.

52 Residential

reference.
.

O Other

U1 f es s ex c: I u d e d 1) e lo w, this sa le s 11 nl I inc lude a i I f i 11 u re s a n d a 1 1 y o I t h e t t em $ sh 0 wn in Se c t i o ft A i f p m se nil y a 11 ac h ed to the

The following personal property shall also be included in this sale and conveyed under separate Bill of Sale with warranties as to title:

„ins.£r.t in pir k room, e l e c t r i c
(b)

£*cluded items.

range

_

"1 i« following items are specifically excluded from this «»u-"a 1 1

f i r e p l a c e

1
items

n o t S p e c i f i c a l l y

i n c l u d e d

.under... (a) ...abc v.a..are_excJLude.d_.fr.onLJ;his_s^LLe.
i l t f O'-lfL""
• • » CONNECTIONS. UTILITIES AND OTHER RIGHTS
Sollr.-r represents that the property includes the h.-!!o\vu;<j .inpn.-.tinonts
,-^;». hi..-s»'.v. r o * ,,rM"' li
QVVUII ©connected 6'other
j<|«..'loi:tMC«ty Xcirmetted
O-'-P'"- tiintO ' v tnxtv J
xJ<mg(ition water/secondary system
^ingress & egress by private nnse^ienj
O other s.mmify system
...
•=• of shares ,', 2
Company N p f f ! S v Xdedicated road Xpaved
Kfjubhe .vater jfconrieoKl
OTV antenna ©master antenna '5 .«v.^M '
gcurb and gutter
Opnvatc water fOccnner ed
Rnatural gas Qconnectcd
5 other rights

(d)

Survey.

(el

Buyer Inspection.

IfI

prior to closing. Dshall not be furnishe

A certified survey Cfehafl be furnished at the expense of

Buyer has made a visual inspection of the property and subject to Section 1 (c) above and 6 below, accepts it in its present physic

condition, fti^pi- n o p v r p p j - i n n . g .

However

f

offer

is

expressly

conditioned upon an

Inspect-ion hy FUiyer wif-hin t e n MO) d a y s p r i o r t o c l o s i n g t o c o n f i r m n o sub-—
^existing survey acceptable
stantial change or loss has occur*
2.

PURCHASE PRICE AND FINANCING, The total purchase pricetorthe property .c T w o h u n d r e d ,
f i f t e e n
t h o u s a n d a n d
: J which shall be paid as follow;
V l f l f l > W H W T f - > w w - W H p l . r , W H - n n > - ^ r H f f f f Dollars {$ 2 * 5 - / 0 D O r f l f t
1-1'% >
S O P , 0 0 which represents the aforedescribed EARNEST MONEY DEPOSIT:
%\5 j 7"?%' SO'
^
:Q% BilQrrQQj
representing the approximate balance, of CASH DOWN PAYMENT at closing,
represent ng the approximate balance of an existing mortgage, trust deed note, real estate com tract or other ei icui nbrai ice to bt: assunti
by buyer, which obligation bears interest at
* •'• "*:h include:

0 principal*

G interest*

% per annum with monthly pai n iei its of $

Otax.es:

Hinsurance:

Dcondo fees;

Oother .

.

- « _ - - _ _ _

representing the approximate balance of an additional existing mortgage, trust deed i w:;ite, real estate c.o^r

U0

! ,,?

'

:tsii m o i l t>y B u v ^ r

w h i r h u h l i { | i i f i u n I w . i ' S i n t n r e s t at ....—

.-.*•• "

:

'"'-

'i< I < t

ii" i 111 11 • • i f

'

:

11 1 • .• i

I

'

i

i•

' "i 11 n
i i \ i r 11111 . .•

: e s to

.
_..

f : I in; 1 1 , • i

' r • « 1 1 1 • I • 11 i ? <,

••*;'-'»« «ui hat.in... x'XMX'KX'K'MN.'M'X'X K A K ' X ^ K X X X X X X X X X X'XK

.iot -applicableMot applicable

,lbi";

"• (I'^r r i i u i i i n i w i t h m o n t h l y p . i v - > ' ' • ••'

Ul h 1

" " I , ; M ' 1 l"

_ ._.

.no.t_&i2iLUj£a b.±£L

3 7l2>sdrkt~-xlot

Applicable

Jb4-iOOOV4y^' T A L PURCHASE PRICE
\ Buyer is required to assume an underlying obligation and ••""Of obtain outside financing. Buyei agrees to use best efforts to assume and /or procure same and th
is made subject, to Buyer qualifying for and lending insiitt ttion grantirfg said assumption and/or financing. Buyer agrees to make application within .
alter Seller s acceptance of this Agreement, to assume the underlying kblig
iyer docs not qualify for the issumption and/or financing withi
e option of the Buyer or Seller upon written notice

on and/or obtain the new financing at an interest rate not to exceed _

'"

tf/s after Seller's acceptance of this Agreement, mis Agreement shall be vo^iab

ieller agrees to pay % .
rfcinc anp closing costs, including, but not limited to. loan discount points
towards Buyer's total financing
' th<$ Agreement involves
the.assumption
ofan existing foah-br,obligation on the property! Section F shall apply.
ves the
assumption of
.• ' .
* ~

./ ";^H^p:

EARNESTMONEY SALES AGREEMENT
legend

Yes (X)

No (0)

This is a legally binding contract. Read the entire document carefully before signing.

GENERAL PROVISIONS
(Sections)
A INCLUDED ITEMS. Unless excluded herein, this sale shall include all fixtures and any of the following items if presently attached to the property: plumbing,
iting, air-conditioning and ventilating fixtures and equipment, water heater, built-in appliances, light fixtures and bulbs, bathroom fixtures, curtains and draperies
J rods, window and door screens, storm doors, window blinds, awnings, installed television antenna, wall-to-wall carpets*, water softener, automatic garage door
jner and transmitter(s). fencing, trees and shrubs.
B
INSPECTION. Unless otherwise indicated. Buyer agrees that Buyer is purchasing said property upon Buyer s own'examination and judgment and not by
son of any representation made to Buyer by Seller or the Listing or Selling Brokerage as to its condition, size, location, present value, future value, income
efrom or as to its production Buyer accepts the property in "as is" condition subject to Seller's warranties as outlined in Section 6 In the event Buyer desires
f additional inspection, said inspection shall be allowed by Seller but arranged for and paid by Buyer
C. SELLER WARRANTIES. Seller warrants that: (a) Seller has received no claim nor notice of any building or zoning violation concerning the property which
> not or will not be remedied prior to closing; (b) all obligations against the property including taxes, assessments, mortgages, hens or other encumbrances
any nature shall be brought current on or before closing; end (c) the plumbing, heating, air conditioning and ventilating systems, electrical system, and appliances
ill be sound or in satisfactory working condition at closing.
0. CONDITION OF WELL. Seller warrants that any private well serving the property has. to the best of Sellers' knowledge, provided on adequate supply of
ter and continued use of the well or wells is authorized by a state permit or other legal water right
E CONDITION OF SEPTIC TANK. Seller warrants that any septic tank serving the property is, to the best of Seller's knowledge, in good working order and
ler has no knowledge of any needed repairs and it meets all applicable government health and construction standards
F. ACCELERATION CLAUSE. No later th8n fifteen (15) days after Seller's acceptance of this Agreement, but not less than three (3) days prior to closing.
Her shall provide to Buyer written verification as to whether or not any notes, mortgages, deeds of trust or real estate contracts against the property require the
isent of the holder of such instrument(s) to the sale of the property or permit the holder to raise the interest rate and/or declare the entire ba'ance due in the
»nt of sale If any such document so provides and holder does not waive the same or unconditionally approve the sale, then within three-(3) days after notice of
nwaiver or disapproval or on the date of closing, whichever is earlier. Buyer shall have the option to declare this Agreement null and void by giving written notice
Seller or Seller's agent. In such case, all earnest money received under this Agreement shall be returned to Buyer It is understood and agreed that if provisions
said "Due on Sale" clause are set forth in Section 7 herein, alternatives allowed herein shall become null and void
G TITLE INSPECTION* No later than fifteen (15) days after Seller's acceptance of this Agreement, but not less than three (3) days prior to closing. Buyer
ill have the opportunity to inspect either an abstract of title brought current with an attorney s opinion, or a preliminary title report on the subject property
yer shall have a period of three (3) days after receipt thereof to examine end accept. If Buyer does not accept. Buyer shall give wntten notice thereof to Seller
Seller's agent, within the prescribed time period specifying objections to title. Thereafter, Seller shall be required, through escrow at closing, to cure the
fect(s) to which Buyer has objected If said defect(s) is not curable through an escrow agreement at closing, this Agreement shall be null and void at the option
the Buyer, and all monies received herewith shall be returned to the respective parties.
H
TITLE INSURANCE. If title insurance is elected, Seller authorizes the Listing Brokerage to order a preliminary commitment for a standard form ALTA
licy of title insurance to be issued by such title insurance company as Seller shall designate Title policy to be issued shall contain no exceptions other than
>se provided for in said standard form and the encumbrances or defects excepted under the final contract of sale If title cannot he made so insurable through
escrow agreement at closing, the earnest money shall, unless Buyer elects to waive such defects or encumbrances be refunded to Buyer, and this Agreement
all thereupon be terminated Seller agrees to pay any cancellation charge
I
EXISTING TENANT LEASES. If Buyer is to take title subject to an existing lease or leases. Seller agrees to provide to Buyer no later than fifteen (1 5) days
er Seller's acceptance of this Agreement but not less than three (3) days prior to closing, a .copy of all existing leases (and any amendments thereto) affecting
I property. Unless written objection is given by Buyer to Seller or Seller s agent within three (3) working days thereolter. Buyer sha'l take title subject to such
ises If objection is not remedied withm the stated time, this Agreement shall be null and void
J
CHANGES OURING TRANSACTION. During the pendency of this Agreement. Sellc agrees i'iat no changes »n any existing 'eases '•-ail be made nor
w leases e'ntered into nor shall any s u ^ ' intial alterations or improvements be made or undertaken without the .vnMen consent of tiu. Buvsr
,GE ONE OF A FOUR PAGE FORM

CONDITION AND CONVEYANCE OF TITLE. Seller represents that Seller Q.holds title to the property in fee simple D is purchasing the property'under
esta^sqntract. Transfer of Seller's ownership interest shall be made as set forth in Section S. Seller agrees to furnish good and marketable title to the
ty, subject to encumbrances and exceptions noted herein, evidenced by D!Da\CUCrentriQlicyLQf .tillejin^uranee i n i h e amount of purchase price Q a r r abstract
•btoughhtvuCT>trvvitH-ef>-ettc<ne.yXopi^ioM^^Sex^iQxiJH).
SCc?
CAhib*'?
A
<'*''<?.
A'.

('

<?

INSPECTION OF TITLE. In accordance ,,with Section G, Buyer shall have the opportunity to inspect the title to the subject property prior to closing.
^hallMak&liltaJ&UbjeClla.^
not. reviewed any condo*
VESTING OF TITLE.

^niti/f^

Title shall vest'lrtBuyer as follows:

M i e n

o r t.r-?n*nri PS' 'r^ Vrf>rf>:d n f

, SELLER WARRANTIES.

R.

Prnlin

'^iP

-~T " n n c ; " -

1^P

' ' ,

'":?--v-y j — j r,

Mosinr,

In addition to warranties contained in Section C, the following items are also warranted: J l l l l ; — 1 •. \'—^r:

^eunder i s l c a a l l - v d i v i d e d and s e p a r a t e fror? thn s^ioiv\Uv
rffnCfltattv^^
* boning r e c o r d s .
•

"

'

.

'

• " • •

• '

^

+- > ^ . —

_
>*«-?>,-• ;-;r>y

1 - t i j «-.••<•,-^ • ,v' ; ; 0 n r : . r
___

:

"

.SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS AND CONTINGENCIES."' This offer is made subject to the following special conditions and/or contingencies which must
isfied priofto'closing;

? :

--fa*.
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CLOSING OF SALE. This Agreement shall be closed on ™ hainr* 'fttrrrrfc«+T
1_ ,"19 J2-6
at a reasonable location to be designated by
, subject to Section Q. Upon demand, Buyer shall deposit with the Escrow Closing Office all documents necessary to complete the purchase in accordance
his Agreement. Prorations set forth in Section R, shall be-made as of QC&alB7ofepos$ess!pp:Q,jdaie"of closing n-other-

i

POSSESSION.

Seller shall deliver possession to Buyer on , l"V, f j , ^ £ ? t

I. GENERAL PROVISIONS,
ment by reference
,

AGREEMENT T6 PURCHASE AND TIME L I M I T FOR ACCEPTANCE.

ture of Buyer
•

\
.

i

~'

•

im

.

1 ./ o unless extended by written agreement of parties.

1 Inless otherwise indicated above, the General Provision Sections on the reverse side hereof are incorporaieu uuu una
"
* *

lave until <<l*' y ' '-K. (AM/ftvjJ), />)r.*. k~Hc$s<P
EST MONEY to the Buyer.
'.'•.'

1

_ _ .

, 1 9 .1? Q
~

•'

/

Buyer offers to purchase the property on the above terms and conditions. Seller

. to accept this offer. Unless accepted, this offer shall lapse and the Agent shalL return the

- / / / A / 1 'J ^• I

•-.•',„„'•

ft^?.<^/^l: /!-*>. •;< .-,*X-?

Date
KT7T

I,

5- / - 9£

Buyer
^^gnature^'f
Z"
/jt r>

'

;

i

7

rDate

K

K ONE
2EPTANCE OF OFFER TO PURCHASE: Seller hereby ACCEPTS the foregoing offer-on the terms and conditions specified above.
JECJJON. Seller hereby REJECTS the foregoing offer. _ _ _ _

.

(Seller's.Initials)

(JNTER OFFER.'Seller hereby accepts the foregoing offer SUBJECTTO.theiexceptiona or inodificotions as*specified below or m the tmached AddericJum, and
sents said COUNTER OFFER for Buyer's-acceptance. Buyer shall have, until
cified below.

r -,„ ^-.—... (A.M > P.M.) . _ „ _

.—. , 19 _

to accept the terms

. (AM-PM)
Signature of Seller
X ONE:

<

.

Signature of Seller

'"•

. • • • • •

••

'

•

yer accepts the counter offer
yer accepts with modifications on attached addendum
/ A M pMi

*' '

Signature of Buyer

*

3 M M I S S I O N . The undersigned hereby agrees to pay to:
f i s s i o n of ^ T / ^
/ r ;- r
* % \
• ,, / v -^
t j

(^~~y
-- t /

t^/Y//y^Mx^^i. iture of Seller

/.

i

*

•

'

/
;

,

Signature of Buyer

z
~7y% ••/ • ,
~~
r. ' ;
••
<
V /. ^-r——- •« consideration for the efforts in procuring a buyer.

5-/j~f6>

&

Date

•

i

,

'

i

•

"

i

• (Brokerage)

'
Signature of Seller

Date

'

'

—

DOCUMENT RECEIPT
tate Law requires Broker !o furnish Buyer and Seller with copies of this Agreement bearing all signatures. {One of the followii lg alteri iatt\ es i i ist t
>mpleted).
. P I acknowledge receipt of a final copy of the foregoing Agreement bearing all signatures: •
ATURE OP SELLER '•'

^
/

__

^

SIGNATURE OF BUYER

Date

( ,^, .. • ,

Date

"

„ ,,

//*"<)

/

Date
Date

.' D l personally caused a final copy of the foregoing Agreement bearing all signatures to be mailed on

, 19

by

fied Mail and return receipt attached hereto to the D Seller • Buyer Sent by
i fhi!!..., .if » fin,r pnrjf» »MMTI

Seller's Initials ( > <'. y(<-

)

^Oatft

/

•

Buyer's Initials ( . ' - . ) < . . • ' ' ) . .

Date

"/

•/

K AUTHORITY OF SIGNATORY
half \,i rarts his or her M thor t, »o o

Ouyc or Sellei »<• ,i cnrpor«ition o<» tn« rslwn tusi
H d to bind Buyer or Scllc

m«

i| «i

,u

u c ,,

<•

i*c

if

h

\(,iinn,[,h

L COMPLETE AGREEMENT — NO VERBAL AGRCEMCMS
This instrument constitutes tho trt.ii* Asi» >mr tt b ( U n n the pam**, fine4 supersedes jrv
ncel, iy nnd all prior negotiations repn <-ontations warran*ies unnerstandings or agreements between tin ptiiii ^ ** er^ &n no verbal a<reemr->ts which modify
affcrt this agroomerit This Agreement cmnot be changed except by mutual wntten agreement of thr part.es
M
COUNTER OFFER,S
Any count»»r offer made bY Seller or Buyer shall be in writing and* .f «ittached hereto shall m<orpo««»u« oil the provisions *J this
Irr* -\rn\ not expressly modified or exel iclod therein
N
DEFAULT/INTERPLEADER AND ATTORNEY'S FEES.* In the event of default by Buyer Seller may elect to either retain the Ernest money as liquidated
mages or to institute suit to enforce any rights of Seller. In the event of default by Seller, or if this sale fails to close because of the ponsatis'actlon of any
press condition or contingency to which the sale is subject pursuant to this Agreement (other than by virtue4jof any default by Buyer), the earnest money deposit
all be returned to Buyer Both parties agree that should either party default in any of the covenants or agreements herein contained th* defaulting party shall
y all costs and expenses including a reasonable attorney's fee, which may arise or accrue from enforcing or terminating this Agreement or in pursuing any
medy provided hereunder or by applicable law. whether such remedy is pursued by filing suit or otherwise In the event the principal broker holding the earnest
3ney deposit is required to file an interpleader action In court to resolve a dispute over the earnest money deposit referred to herein the Buyer and Seller
thorize the principal broker to draw from the earnest money deposit an amount necessary to advance the costs of bringing the 'nterpleader action The amount
deposit remaining after advancing those costs shall be interpleaded into court in accordance with state law The Bxiyrit and Seller further agree that ihedefau'ting
rty shall paylhe.court coats am!* reasonable attorney's fefcymcurred by the principal broker in bringing such action
0

ABROGATION.

Execution of a final real estate contract, if any,^shall abrogate this Agreement

P
RISK OF LOSS. All risk of loss or damage to the property shall be borne by the Seller until closing In the event there is loss or damage to the property
tween the date hereof and the date cf closing, by reason of fire, vandalism, flood, earthquake, or acts of God. and the cost to repair such damage shall exceed
i percent (10%) of the purchase pnee of the property, Buyer may, at his option either proceed with this transacticn if Seller agrees in writing to repair or
place damaged property prior to closing or declare this Agreement null and void If damage to property is less than ten percent (10/o) of the purchase price
d Seller agrees in writing to repair or replace and does actually repair and replace damaged property prior to closing this transaction shall proceed as agreed
Q
TIME IS OF ESSENCE—UNAVOIDABLE DELAY. In the event that this sale cannot be closed by the date provicledtherein due to interruption of transport
ikes, fire, flood extreme weather governmental regulations, acts of God. or similar occurrences beyond the control of Buyer or Seller then the closing date shall
extended seven (7) days beyond cessation of such condition, but in no event more than thirty (30) days beyond the closing date provided herein Thereafter
ne is of the essence This provision relates only to the extension of closing date "Closing' shall mean the date on which all necessary instruments are signed
d delivered by all parties to the transaction
R CLOSING COSTS. Seller and Buyer shall each pay one-half (1 / 2) of the escrow closing fee, unless otherwise required by the lending institution Costs
providing title insurance or an abstract brought current shall be paid by Seller Taxes and assessments for the current year, insurance if acceptable to the Buyer
nts, and interest on assumed obligations shallibe prorated as set forth in Section 8 Unearned deposits on tenancies and remaining mortgage or other reserves
all be assigned to Buyer at closing
S
REAL PROPERTY CONVEYANCING. If this agreement is for conveyance of fee title, title shall be conveyed by warranty deed free of defects other than
ose excepted herein If this Agreement is for sale or transfer of a Seller's interest under an existing real estate contract Seller may transfer by either (a) special
irranty deed, containing Seller s assignment of said contract in form sufficient to convey after acquired title or (b) by a new real estate contract incorporating the
id existing real estate contract therein
T

AGENCY DISCLOSURE.

U

BROKERAGE.

V

DAYS.

Selling Brokerage may have entered into an agreement to represent the Seller

For purposes of this Agreement, any references to the term 'Brokerage

shall mean the respective listing or selling real estate office

For purposes of this Agreement, any references to the term "days" shall mean business or working days exclusive of legal holidays

AGE FOUR OF A FOUR PAGE FORM

THIS FORM HAS BEEN APPROVED BY THE UTAH REAL ESTATE COMMISSION

EXHIBIT A

T h i s E x h i b i t s h a l l s e r v e a s an a d d e n d u m s t a t i n g
a d d i t i o n a l t e r m s of t h a t o f f e r t o p u r c h a s e in t h e a t t a c h e d
E a r n e s t Money S a l e s A g r e e m e n t d a t e d fiarcfy / &
, 1986,
o f f e r e d by A l l e n R. G r a h n and J o s e p h i n e M. G r a h n ,
identified
t h e r e i n as Buyer.
( I t i s t h e second such a t t a c h m e n t .
That
p r e v i o u s E x h i b i t i s s u p e r s e d e d h e r e b y a n d s h a l l h a v e no
f u r t h e r f o r c e or e f f e c t .
The a t t a c h e d A g r e e m e n t , w i t h t h i s
E x h i b i t , s h a l l , form t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g b e t w e e n t h e p a r t i e s ;
i t b e i n g a c k n o w l e d g e d by B u y e r t h a t t h e o f f e r
expiration
d a t e was e x t e n d e d , and t h a t t h i s E x h i b i t r e f l e c t s n e g o t i a t e d
amendments to Buyer's offer.)
The t e r m s h e r e o f a r e h e r e b y
i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o the s a i d A g r e e m e n t , as if more f u l l y _ s e t
forth therein.
To t h e e x t e n t t h a t a n y o f t h e t e r m s h e r e o f
a r e i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e t e r m s of t h e s a i d A g r e e m e n t , t h e
t e r m s of t h i s E x h i b i t s h a l l c o n t r o l .
Otherwise, all other
t e r m s of t h e a t t a c h e d E a r n e s t Money S a l e s A g r e e m e n t s h a l l
remain the same.
A.
With r e s p e c t
to p a r a g r a p h
1(c),
it
is
u n d e r s t o o d and a g r e e d t h a t t h e p a r t i e s i n t e n d t h a t B u y e r s 1
i n s p e c t i o n of t h e p r o p e r t y i s s o l e l y f o r t h e p u r p o s e of
d e t e r m i n i n g t h a t the p r o p e r t y has not been s u b s t a n t i a l l y
harmed or o t h e r w i s e l o s t v a l u e p r i o r t o c l o s i n g due to such
t h i n g s a s , by way of e x a m p l e , w i t h o u t l i m i t a t i o n
intended,
v a n d a l i s m , f i r e , a c t s of G o d , o r o t h e r c a u s e s f o r w h i c h
S e l l e r assumes the r i s k .
B.
The b a l a n c e o f $ 1 1 5 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 w h i c h i s r e f e r r e d
i n PARAGRAPH 2 of t h e a t t a c h e d E a r n e s t Money S a l e s A g r e e m e n t
s h a l l b e p a i d a s f o l i o v; s :
s u b j e c t t o t h e t e r m s and
c o n d i t i o n s of a s t a n d a r d l o n g f o r m T r u s t Deed and T r u s t Deed
N o t e p r o v i d i n g f o r i n t e r e s t a t t h e r a t e o f 9% p e r a n n u m on
t h e p r i n c i p a l b a l a n c e , a n d p a y m e n t s of i n t e r e s t o n l y on a
m o n t h l y b a s i s in t h e a m o u n t of a p p r o x i m a t e l y $ 8 6 3 . 0 0 p e r
m o n t h , and a b a l l o o n p a y m e n t of t h e t o t a l a m o u n t d u e p a y a b l e
on o r b e f o r e t h e f i f t h a n n i v e r s a r y d a t e o f t h e d a t e of
c l o s i n g , a n d f u r t h e r p r o v i d i n g t h a t t h e s a i d a m o u n t may b e
p a i d a t any t i m e p r i o r t o c l o s i n g w i t h o u t p r e p a y m e n t p e n a l t y
of any s o r t .
In a d d i t i o n t h e r e t o , an a d d e n d u m s h a l l b e
p l a c e d w i t h t h e U t a h l o n g f o r m T r u s t Deed t o p r o v i d e a s
follows:
No s a l e o f t h e p r o p e r t y w h i c h i s t h e s u b j e c t of
t h i s T r u s t Deed, o r a n y p a r t t h e r o f , s h a l l be p e r m i t t e d
u n t i l t h e i n d e b t e d n e s s s e c u r e d by t h i s T r u s t Deed i s
r e p a i d i n f u l l , a n d , i n t h e e v e n t of s u c h a s a l e p r i o r
to such r e p a y m e n t in f u l l ,
the o b l i g a t i o n
secured
h e r e b y s h a l l be in d e f a u l t and t h e e n t i r e
principal
b a l a n c e and i n t e r e s t t h e r e o n s h a l l b e c o m e i m m e d i a t e l y
1

d u e and p a y a b l e , at the o p t i o n of the b e n e f i c i a r y of
this Trust Deed, which option shall be exercised within
f o r t y - f i v e (45) d a y s of n o t i c e of the said sale to the
said beneficiary.

C. As referred to in P A R A G R A P H 7 of the a t t a c h e d
E a r n e s t M o n e y S a l e s A g r e e m e n t , the offer is s p e c i f i c a l l y
subject
to t h e f o l l o w i n g
special conditions
and/or
contingencies•which must be satisfied prior to closing:
i. T h i s o f f e r is s u b j e c t to B u y e r s s e l l i n g
and c l o s i n g on the sale of their h o m e located at 3735
E m i g r a t i o n C a n y o n p r i o r to the c l o s i n g on the sale
w h i c h is the s u b j e c t of this A g r e e m e n t ,
Provided,
h o w e v e r , that the S e l l e r m a y c o n t i n u e to offer the
p r o p e r t y d e s c r i b e d h e r e i n for sale and to c o n s i d e r
o f f e r s to p u r c h a s e the s a m e , s u b j e c t to B u y e r s 1 first
right of r e f u s a l .
S h o u l d S e l l e r r e c e i v e an o f f e r
a g a i n s t the p r o p e r t y w h i c h S e l l e r d e s i r e s to a c c e p t ,
then Seller shall have the duty to give notice thereof
to B u y e r , w h i c h n o t i c e shall be a c c o m p a n i e d by a c o p y
of the offer a n d / o r other a c c e p t a b l e proof that a
bona
fide w r i t t e n o f f e r has been r e c e i v e d by the
Seller.
Seller shall
represent,
in
connection
t h e r e w i t h , that S e l l e r d e s i r e s to a c c e p t the said
offer, subject to Buyers 1 first right of refusal.
Prom
•the d a t e of r e c e i p t of said n o t i c e , Buyer shall h a v e
seven (7) d a y s w i t h i n w h i c h to g i v e n o t i c e to the
Seller, in writing,' of Buyers' waiver of the aforesaid
condition that Buyers 1 home be sold and closed prior: to
closing on Buyers' purchase hereunder.
Thereupon, \the
said o f f e r of w h i c h S e l l e r g a v e B u y e r n o t i c e s h a l l
fail, and Buyer and Seller shall close the sale called
for in this A g r e e m e n t w i t h i n s i x t y (60) d a y s of ..the
d a t e of the said n o t i c e at a r e a s o n a b l e
location
d e s i g n a t e d by the S e l l e r .
The said sale s h a l l t&ke
p l a c e p u r s u a n t to and under the t e r m s and c o n d i t i o n s
set forth in this o f f e r , e x c e p t that the i n t e r e s t
payments called for under the Trust Deed Note shall not
c o m m e n c e for a p e r i o d less than f o r t y - f i v e (45) d a y s
from the date of closing.
Should Buyer fail to remove
the. said contingency regarding the sale of Buyers 1 home
in E m i g r a t i o n C a n y o n , then this A g r e e m e n t shall fail
for failure to satisfy this contingency and the earnest
m o n e y d e p o s i t m a d e by B u y e r s h e r e u n d e r s h a l l be
refunded, in full.
i i • T h i s o f f e r is f u r t h e r c o n d i t i o n e d upon
the s u b j e c t p r o p e r t y b e i n g f r e e of
unreasonably
r e s t r i c t i v e e a s e m e n t s or r i g h t s of w a y in favor of
o t h e r s . B u y e r shall be d e l i v e r e d the p o l i c y of title
insurance, or the preliminary report thereto, at least
five d a y s prior to s c h e d u l e d c l o s i n g ; and B u y e r s h a l l
n o t i f y Seller prior to c l o s i n q of any b u r d e n s w h i c h
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exist which cause this condition not to be satisfied,
closing shall be postponed, and Seller shall have ten
days from receipt of such notice to satisfy the subject
condition by r e m o v a l of the burden(s) or other
adjustment acceptable to Buyer.

D.
In addition to the foregoing, tfte following
conditions and terms are set forth herein as part of the
c o n s i d e r a t i o n for the attached Earnest Money Sales
Agreement, of which this Exhibit is a part.
With respect to the one-half acre lot adjoining
the lot which is the subject of this Agreement, Seller
hereby grants to Buyer the first option to purchase the said
half acre lot. Seller agrees that, should Seller receive an
offer from any third party to purchase the said adjoining
half acre lot, Which Seller desires to accept, Seller shall
give notice of that desire, in writing, to the Buyer, along
with a copy of the said offer and, if required by Buyer,
other proof that Seller has receiveda bona fide offer to
purchase the said property.
The said,notice shall indicate
and/or be deemed, pursuant to this Agreement, to be an offer
by Seller to sell the property to Buyer under the same terms
and conditions as those set forth in the said written offer,
attached to the notice. Buyer shall have seven (7) days
within which to accept the said offer by giving Seller
written notice of Buyers1 desire to purchase under the said
terms and conditions\ Should Buyer fail to' exercise Buyers1
opt ion under th is pr& vision, then Seller shall have the
right to sell the property within ninety (90) days of the
date of the expiration of Sellers* said option on terms and
conditions no more favorable than those originally offered
emph.
under this paragraph to Buyer. Should the offer be amended supplied
making the terms more favorable, or should the said offer
fail and a new offer be received, then the said amendment or
offer shall be, once again, subject to the terms of this
provision.
The terms of this p r o v i s ion shall survive the
closing of the purchase of the property which is the subject'
of the main Agreement.
_ ,
Should S e l l e r s e l l the a d j o i n i n g o n e - h a l f
a c r e l o t to any t h i r d p a r t y a f t e r B u y e r s ' f a i l u r e to
purchase
the same under
t h e t e r m s of t h e
next
proceeding paragraph, S e l l e r f u r t h e r agrees hereby to
g r a n t on c a s e m e n t and r e s t r i c t i v e c o v e n a n t , in f a v o r of
3

the owners of the land which is the subject: of this
main agreement, which covenant shall run with the land,
Jt£ w_ij^: a requirement that the trees and brush not be
removed" (Acts of God removing or necessitating removal
of the same excepted) from the one-half acre lot from
any point within fifteen (15) feet of the existing 4 -,
drive which separates the two lots, it being understood emph.
that the said trees and brush effectively serve as an s u p p l i e d
asthetic break between the properties, as well as a
geologic protection against erosion onto the property
which is' the subject of the main agreement.
Should
such trees and/or brush be removed as a result of an
act of God, the owner of the benefitted property shall
have the right, but not duty, to re-plant the protected
area .

E. W i t h r e s p e c t t o p a r a g r a p h 3 . of t h e a t t a c h e d ,
i t i s agreed t h a t S e l l e r s h a l l e v i d e n c e the t i t l e to the
p r o p e r t y ( p r o v i d e d a c c o r d i n g t o t h e p r o v i s i o n s of t h a t
s e c t i o n , among o t h e r s ) by a c u r r e n t p o l i c y of
title
i n s u r a n c e in t h e amount of t h e p u r c h a s e p r i c e , and not by-an
abstract.
S e e , a l s o G e n e r a l P r o v i s i o n II.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, t h e Buyers and S e l l e r s h e r e b y
a c k n o w l e d g e t h e i r a g r e e m e n t t h a t t h e f o r e g o i n g i s *an
i n t e g r a l p a r t of t h e a f o r e m e n t i o n e d E a r n e s t Money S a l e s
Agreement which has a l s o been f u l l y e x e c u t e d by the p a r t i e s .

oJJUsn

Buyer

/2- <3/7^~As^i^

Dated:

//Buy^r

3 V -S6

4

Dated:

"3-/-j>G

ECCLES, CAROLINE T

(TR)

2811 E BROOKBURN RD
SLC, UT

84109

Property d e s c r i p t i o n and l o c a t i o n :
BEG 25 RDS S & 9'*2 FT E FR NV COR SEC 55 T IS
R IE SL MER E 5-58 FT S 220 FT M OR L TO CEN OF
MILL CREEK E'LY & SE'LY ALG SD CREEK 8 9 . 2 2 FTtf
S 6 4 . 6 FT; S'LY ALG CURVE TO R 5 8 . 4 5 FT;
S 2 8 ° 1 5 ' 2 9 " W 4 9 . 5 5 FT; SW'LY ALG CURVE TO R
8 8 . 0 1 5 FT; S 8 4 . 7 7 FT; W 1 0 2 . 1 2 5 FT; N 555 FT M
OR L TO CEN OF HILL CREEK; SE'LY ALG SD CEN LINE
TO A PT S FR BEG; N 220 FT M OR L TO BEG.

1 . 1 1 AC

5576-82

Addendum 5

EXHIBIT B

3215 Skycrest Circle
Salt Lake City, UT 84108
21 November 1986
Mr. and Mrs. Allen Grahn
3735 emigration Canyon
oalt Lake Jity, UT 84108
Dear Allen and Josephine:
We need to call your attention to a mutual •
mistake in connection with the property located at
2811 Brookburn Koad which you are in the process of
acquiring from us.
As you know, the total property consisted of
two different parcels. Based upon a previous survey,
we presumed that the driveway to the larger (one acre)
piece was the boundary. In fact, however, the new
survey shows that the lane is mostly on the one-half
acre piece. The error was in locating the driveway.
nothing is changed in the legal descriptions.
You still have the same amount of property that was
deeded to you. However, the buyer of the one-half
acre piece needs to have your driveway moved so that
he can proceed with the construction of his home.
There appear to be two alternatives:
1)

We can move the driveway for you.

2)

We will have to refund your money and take
back the property.

What would you like to do to resolve this
situation?
We are very sorry this happened, and we hope
the matter can be resolved to everyone's satisfaction.

ooe

Addendum 6

AGREEMENT
THIS AGREEMENT is made and entered into on this 20th day
of November, 1986 by and between Herold L. Gregory, as Trustee of
Albert Eccles Family Trust (hereinafter referred to as "Seller"),
and Dean Bradshaw (hereinafter referred to as "Buyer"),
WITNESSETH
WHEREAS, Seller was at one time the owner of a tract of
land in East Mill Creek whereon was located the former residence of
the Albert Eccles family; and
WHEREAS, a private roadway and driveway serves such
property originating near,the Southwest corner of the property and
running East Northeasterly through the property to such former
residence, and
WHEREAS, a survey was prepared in 1984 of the subjectproperty which purported to locate such driveway and to create
legal descriptions for the homesite and an additional parcel to the
Southeast of such drive containing approximately 0.56 acres; and
WHEREAS, the Southeast parcel hereinafter referred to as
"building site" was conveyed to a family member for the purpose of
building a residence but has since been reconveyed to the Seller;
and
WHEREAS, the homesite parcel was previously sold in
accordance with such descriptions to a third party without specific
reference to the driveway, although the Seller and third party
buyer may have presumed that the driveway was included within the
homesite parcel, and such parcel was described in accordance with
such survey descriptions; and
WHEREAS, a subsequent survey has determined that the
former survey was in error in designating the location of the
driveway; and
WHEREAS, the building site would contain substantially
less than 0.56 acres if the descriptions were modified such that
the driveway was totally within the homesite, and would be more
difficult for Buyer to construct his home in accordance with plans
already partially prepared; and

WHEREAS, Buyer is nonetheless willing to purchase the
property in accordance with the former survey description
recognizing that future claims of the homesite purchaser may result
in reduction of the land area of the building site if it is
subsequently determined that the homesite description must be
amended to include the land between the conveyed homesite and the
Southeasterly side of the existing homesite driveway as presently
located; and Buyer is willing to assume the risk that the site may
be reduced in size in accordance with the above, and to indemnify
Seller from all costs or liabilities that may result from Seller
conveying to Buyer the property as per the original survey
description formerly used in conveying same to an Eccles family
member (Barbara).
NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the agreements herein
contained, it is mutually covenanted and agreed as follows:
1. Seller shall convey said building site to Buyer
utilizing the legal description provided in connection with the
first survey aforementioned purporting to contain approximately
0.56 acres.
2. Notwithstanding any warranties or covenants contained
in said conveyance, it is mutually agreed that Seller is conveying
the portion of the parcel lying within the existing driveway as
well as the portion lying Northwest of the existing driveway by
quitclaim only, subject to such defenses and claims as may at some
date arise by virtue of future claims of Allen R. Grahn and
Josephine M. Grahn,(hereinafter referred to as "Grahn") the
purchasers of the existing homesite and anyone claiming by, through
or under them.
3. Should litigation ensue wherein Grahn claims a right
to conveyance of the land lying Northwest of the Southeast line of
existing drive, Buyer agrees, in cooperation with Seller, to
equally participate in the cost of defending such claim and any
damages awarded Grahn, if any; and should Grahn be awarded such
property Buyer agrees to accept title to the remaining portion of
the property without abatement of the purchase price provided
necessary governmental approvals are obtainable to permit
construction and maintenance of a residence on the building site.
Buyer assumes all risk of gaining all necessary governmental
approvals for construction whether or not the building site remains
at approximately 0.56 acres.

4. Seller agrees to cooperate with Buyer in reasonable
efforts to resolve any dispute that may arise over such segment of
ground which was not at any time conveyed to Grahn, including
willingness of Seller to relocate such driveway, without expense to
Buyer should such a program be required in order to resolve any
potential dispute with Grahn.
5. In case of default in performing the terms of this
agreement, the defaulting party shall be responsible for costs
incurred in enforcing same or any right arising out of the breach
thereof including reasonable attorneys fees.
6. It is mutually recognized that this agreement is
executed as a condition precedent to the willingness of Seller to
sell and convey the subject property to Buyer, inasmuch as the
potential discrepancy has been discovered prior to such sale,
7 73^r-v.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we have caused the foregoing agreement
to be executed on the day and year first above written.
Albert Eccles Family Trust (Seller)

Buyer:
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Dean Br'adshaw

